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INTRODUCTION

A revolutionary shift in international cooperation is underway.
Many
governments,
frustrated
with
dissension
hampering
multilateral trade reform at the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),
are now turning to bilateral and regional treaties to forward their
commercial interests.1 Under these agreements, which rocketed from
1.
This shift, though having escaped thorough and sustained attention from the legal
academy, has been followed closely in the U.S. print media. See generally Constant Brand, EU
Forges Ahead with Free Trade Plans, HOUS. CHRON., May 13, 2006, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2006/05/13/eu forges-ahead-with-freetrade_
plans/?rss-id=Boston.com+%2F+News (discussing prospects of a free trade agreement between
the EU and Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama); Edwin
Chen, Bush Keeps Campaigning for Free Trade, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005, at 3 (discussing
President Bush's meeting with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva to discuss the Free
Trade Area of the Americas); David Greising & Andrew Martin, U.S. to Pursue Regional,
Individual Trade Talks, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 2003, at 1 ("[The United States and the European
Union likely will emphasize a regional approach and negotiate with individual nations in hopes
of avoiding future impasses in large-scale global talks .... "); Tom Wright, Trade Focus Now
Shifts to Regional Deals, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2006, at C3 ("[Riegional agreements are likely to
become a more important motor of trade liberalization in years ahead .... "). Foreign media, too,
have directed considerable resources charting the shift in treaty-making. For just a sampling, see
Gaurav Choudhury, Kamal Nath Defends India's Bilateral Trade Agreements, HINDUSTAN
TIMES,
Jan.
17,
2007,
available at
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/
StoryPage.aspx?id=6d89d239-c6e3-47e2-95dc-4028396ed3be,
which discusses the creation of
economic units in India, Asia, and Europe; Richard Lapper, Latin America: Oil-fired Socialism,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2007, at 5, which discusses the same in Venezuela and the Americas; Hisane
Masaki, Free trade: Japan and ... Switzerland?, ASIA TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/IA25Dh01.html, which discusses the same in Japan and
Switzerland.
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fewer than 390 in 1989 to more than 2,400 today, 2 states have
relinquished key aspects of their economic sovereignty to participate
in two-party pacts and regional trade clubs like the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the European Union ("EU"). As
a result of such cooperation, most countries no longer may levy tariffs
easily, subsidize their domestic industries, or expropriate foreign
investment without compensation. Instead, states are increasingly
bound by what some commentators describe as a "spaghetti bowl" 3 of
side arrangements and special commitments that restrict their ability
to extract rents from participants in their economic alliances.
Though academics have occasionally discussed whether
regional and bilateral instruments threaten the hegemony of the
multilateral trading system, they have paid no attention to equally
important tensions arising between regional and bilateral agreements
themselves. Instead, scholars almost universally have treated
bilateral and regional agreements as functionally indistinguishable.
This Article argues, however, that bilateral instruments comprise a
distinct and important mode of cooperation that at times operates
inconsistently with the aims of some regional organizations and their
members. In addition to seriously undermining the collective
bargaining efforts of regional organizations, bilateral agreements
potentially alter the economic relations between an organization's
stronger and weaker members. Generally, stronger countries in
regional organizations are positioned to craft internal and external
regional policies that protect their own sensitive markets while
liberalizing those of weaker members. Bilateralism unsettles this
arrangement by granting smaller states opportunities to leverage
relationships with outsiders and at times liberalize their markets in
ways more economically favorable than those available regionally.
The conflict between overlapping bilateral and regional
regimes, which this Article refers to as "structural inconsistency,"
carries critical implications for international economic law. Unlike
2.
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Quantitative Data on
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Treaties, 1989-2003, available at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=3150&lang=l
(last visited Oct. 19,
2007) (indicating that in 1989, 389 bilateral treaties were in force, while in 2003, over 2000
bilateral investment treaties were in force); see also WTO.org, Regional Trade Agreements
Notified to the GATT/WTO and in Force, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/eif-e.xls
(last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (showing 24 bilateral and regional trade treaties in force as of
January 1, 1990, compared with 193 regional and bilateral trade treaties currently notified to
the WTO and in force as of September 15, 2006).
3.
See Alphabetti Spaghetti, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at S19 (citing noted Columbia
economist Jagdish Bhagwati's view that "preferential trade agreements create a 'spaghetti bowl'
of overlapping rules.., sure to distort some investment decisions").
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bilateral treaties, which, as nondiscriminatory arrangements, are not
designed to keep counterparties from signing future agreements with
other parties, regional treaties are at times exclusive arrangements
that prohibit signatories from independently concluding commercial
agreements with third parties. As a result, regional agreements may
obstruct bilateral treatymaking and, in the process, prevent members
from maximizing their own welfare-as well as that of the region. This
insight suggests that regional treaties hold implications for efficiency
in bilateral settings that are potentially as far reaching as
regionalism's impact on multilateral forums, where regional
institutions often stymie efforts to initiate broad global reforms.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I begins by examining
the principal theoretical arguments regarding the implications that
regional organizations, frequently referred to as regional integration
arrangements ("RIAs"), have for international economic discipline. It
argues that the conventional terms of academic debate center on the
comparative merits of regionalism and multilateralism and, in doing
so, overlook the most common form of international cooperationbilateralism. Examining the most common bilateral commercial
agreements-bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") and bilateral free
trade agreements ("BFTAs")-this Part argues that bilateralism
challenges the traditional terms of debate by expanding the universe
of possible forms of economic cooperation and integration to include
two-party arrangements. In these more limited contexts, the kinds of
bargains struck may often differ from those agreed on in multiparty
contexts. Some states will enter into deeper sectoral commitments
with counterparties in bilateral negotiations because their gains are
more concrete than in multiparty deals and because states have few
coalitions and credible hold out opportunities with which to avoid
opening home markets. 4 However, such agreements may prove
unacceptable, especially where a member state and a rival to a
powerful member of an RIA conclude a lucrative bilateral agreement.
In response, RIAs, which increasingly govern their members' economic
relations with third-party states ("outsiders"), 5 may demand the
4.
See, e.g., Pamela A. Fuller, The Japan-U.S.Income Tax Treaty: Signaling New Norms,
Inspiring Reforms, or Just Tweaking Anachronisms in International Tax Policy?, 40 INT'L
LAWYER 773, 838-39 (2006) (noting that small developing countries "do not always have the
requisite resources to negotiate a set of advantageous bilateral tax treaties," which leaves them
at a major disadvantage in attracting investments).
5.
See, e.g., Chun Hung Ling, Regionalism or Globalism? The Process of
Telecommunication Cooperationwithin the OAS and NAFTA, 11 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 30,
32-33 (2002) ("[T]he basic character of regionalism is discrimination against non-members, third
parties. While the regional agreement provides zero tariffs on trade among signatories and gives
preferential treatment for member countries, tariffs for non-members are not lowered.").
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termination or amendment of the economically sensitive bilateral
accord.
To provide an empirical grounding for these claims, Part II
considers two situations in which structural inconsistency
dramatically informed the interaction between bilateral and regional
cooperative regimes. The first case study examines the European
Community's ("EC") demand in 2004 that its accession candidates
terminate their BITs with the United States as a precondition for
accession. 6 In exploring important policy discrepancies between the
BITs and EC law on investment, this Part addresses structural
inconsistency in what this article describes as "closed" RIAs-that is,
those regional institutions that formally bar or restrict member states
from entering into independent bilateral agreements] The second case
study features Venezuela's attempts to use the regional norms of the
Andean Community and Mercosur-South America's largest regional
organizations-to obstruct its regional partners from entering into
bilateral trade agreements with the United States. 8 This case study
illustrates the significant political obstacles to bilateral cooperation
present even in "open" RIAs, which grant members liberty to fashion
their own economic foreign policies. It also demonstrates the serious
organizational spillovers that the political dynamics in one RIA may
*have for the development of other (closed and open) RIAs.
Part III uses the case studies featured in Part II to argue that
regional integration poses challenges to efficiency in bilateral contexts
that are potentially as significant as regionalism's impact on the
WTO, where RIAs may obstruct multilateral liberalization efforts.
This Part demonstrates that, in undermining bilateral treaties
promoting free trade, regionalism imposes negative net effects on
global efficiency. And even where regional integration provides net
benefits to RIA members as a group, it is likely that these gains will
not be distributed evenly. Powerful countries generally will benefit
more than weaker ones and likely will block measures to allocate
6.
See infra Part II.A. For the purposes of this Article, I make reference primarily to the
European Community, as opposed to the more common designation "European Union," because
the EC, one of three pillars of the EU, is the relevant institution governing the EU's commercial
policy, as well as the official legal personality that committed member states to policies with
which U.S. BITs ultimately conflicted. See id.
7.
This language is largely adapted from conventional debates on the usefulness of RIAs in
the multilateral context, where scholars largely define "open" regionalism as that which extends
the terms and benefits of regional integration to the rest of the world and "closed" regionalism
that locks in special benefits for members. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 4, at 872-73 ("The options
include: . . . closed regionalism, whereby trade benefits are not extended at all; and . . . open

regionalism, whereby benefits are extended unilaterally.").
8. See infra Part I.B.
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gains more evenly. Similarly, early members to RIAs may benefit
more from membership than latecomers. Consequently, bilateral
agreements may provide more benefits for these strategically
disadvantaged countries than will regional programs. Such
circumstances generally will incentivize states to defect from regional
commitments-though not all countries will be equally positioned to
do so. Rational choice theory, along with the practicalities of regional
politics, suggests that it will be more difficult for small countries to
retreat from unproductive regional commitments than their larger
neighbors because they likely depend more on strong reputations
within the group to effectuate policy goals. The Article thus concludes
that the more powerful a country is, the better positioned it will be not
only to write regional rules benefiting itself-thereby prolonging the
structural inconsistency problem-but also to defect from regional
rules if and when better bilateral deals present themselves.
I. INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC DISCIPLINE

A. Regionalism-and Whether Second Best is Really Optimal
1. The Rise of Regional Integration
Multilateral
economic
integration,
embodied
most
comprehensively in the WTO, has long has enjoyed premier status in
the literature on global economic discipline. Many scholars are united
by a common commitment to core principles like nondiscrimination
and have argued that worldwide liberalization increases global
welfare by breaking down unproductive national barriers to more
efficient providers of goods and services. 9 In short, resources will find
their best and most economically productive use. Proponents of
9.
For a sample of some of the more important works in the economics and legal literature,
see generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI & ANNE 0. KRUEGER, THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS (1995), which analyzes the United States' "infatuation" with free trade
areas and whether NAFTA is strengthening or weakening the international trading system;
ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND DEEPER INTEGRATION (1996),
which examines the debate over whether regional arrangements are stumbling blocks or building
blocks for a more integrated and successful international economy; MAURICE SCHIFF & ALAN
WINTERS, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2003), which evaluates regionalism from
the perspective of developing countries and presents a comprehensive account of existing theory
and empirical results; Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 39
(2006) [hereinafter Cho, Defragmenting], which argues that the current proliferation of regional
trade agreements has fragmented world trade, impeding the WTO from fulfilling its purpose for
existence.
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multilateral trading thus argue that it is of paramount importance to
promote economic reform as broadly and amongst as many countries
as possible. 10 When countries refrain from applying discriminatory
taxes and policies to imports, competition is maximized, and
consumers around the world enjoy optimal prices and an efficient
allocation of resources.
The expansion of the multilateral trading system suggests that
many countries agree, at least in part, with such views. Since its
inauguration in 1994, the WTO has increased its membership from
128 states to just more than 150 members.
This growth,
accompanied by new rounds of tariff reduction, has heralded a
vigorous multilateral framework facilitating the free flow of goods and
the equal treatment (or "nondiscrimination") of foreign capital and
12
goods.
Nevertheless, multilateralism is no longer the primary driver
of plurilateral economic reform. Instead, regional organizations have
experienced even more impressive growth over the last two decades,
with the near doubling of market representation under the EC and the
Association of South East Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), along with the
creation of nearly twenty RIAs, including South America's largest,
Mercosur. Under these more geographically limited pacts-which
escape the WTO's general obligation of nondiscrimination and now
facilitate nearly one third of world trade13-select
(usually
neighboring) member states pledge to adopt common legal rules or
principles regarding, at a minimum, the preferential treatment of
goods from other members of the organization. Signatories to regional
organizations agree to certain obligations such as most-favored nation
("MFN") treatment whereby a state accords to a counterparty the
same favorable terms it offers in agreements with other nations, and
national treatment, whereby a state affords another state's nationals

10. See sources cited supra note 9.
11. World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/English/
thewto e/whatise/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2007) (noting that there were 151
members as of July 27, 2007).
12. See Mohamed Ariff, Why Failureis Not an Option at Doha Talks, NEW STRAITS TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2006, at 22 (noting that the WTO Doha talks must succeed if freer flow of goods is to
occur worldwide); see also Scott Billquist, Update on CE, Telephony, Internet Rules Sought in
WTO
Talks,
COMM.
DAILY,
Sept.
6,
2007,
available at
http://www.itic.org/
archives/articles/2007b/commDaily-090607.php (discussing WTO members' general reduction of
tariffs and noting that the WTO's multilateral framework must be altered to allow for a WTO
Information Technology Agreement).
13. SCHIFF & WINTERS, supra note 9, at 1; see also infra note 31 (describing the WTO rules
permitting RIAs).
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the same benefits and treatment that it affords its own. 14 Some RIAs,
15
like the EU, go further, and address investment and services.
Finally, other RIAs, such as NAFTA and the Central American Free
Trade Agreement ("CAFTA"), grant one another's investors16standing
to sue states who fail to live up to their treaty commitments.
Not surprisingly, the swath and degree of integration espoused
regionally vary widely. In some institutions, like the African Union
("AU") and Mercosur, regional integration comprises increasingly
centralized and interventionist capacity, building in a range of
important sectors. 17 Other RIAs involve much more minimalist

14. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2007), available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/
1El-mostfavo.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (defining the "most-favored nation" clause).
15. See infra Part II.A.1.
16. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 11, sec. B, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) (providing for private settlement dispute mechanisms against host
states); Central American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Cent. Am.-Dom. Rep., art. 10.16, Aug. 5,
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTAat
available
2004,
DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html.
17. For example, besides incorporating (albeit much less comprehensively) the EU's basic
political organs of a council, commission and parliament, the AU, an organization of fifty-three
African member states, also possesses significant interventionist powers and aspirations. In
terms of security and human rights, the organization coordinates the Pan-African Stand-by
Rapid Reaction Force, already active in Darfur, and envisions that this number will grow to
15,000

troops

by

2010.

TIMOTHY

MURITHI,

THE

AFRICAN

UNION:

PAN-AFRICANISM,

PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT 34 (2005). And in economic matters, the AU's Trade
Ministerial is the continent's foremost institution in the coordination of intra-regional, interregional, and multilateral trade agreements. Under the treaties constituting the AU, subregional agreements are meant to be consolidated. INT'L CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE
UNIONS,

THE

SPREAD

OF

BILATERAL

AND

REGIONAL

TRADE

AGREEMENTS

11

(2004)

also directs financial
The organization
http://www.gurn.info/topic/trade/icftu-0604.pdf.
institutions that include the African Investment Bank and the African Monetary Fund.
Alongside these financial institutions, the organization has spearheaded the development of a
central bank, whose currently modest regulatory functions are scheduled to include the issuing
of the planned African Single Currency by 2028. AFRICAN UNION, STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE AFRICAN UNION, 2004-2007 STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMISSION OF

THE AFRICAN UNION 54 (2004), http://www.africa-union.org/AU summit 2004/volume 2 final English - June 2004.pdf.

Mercosur, a South American bloc consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Venezuela, and
Uruguay as full members, and Bolivia and Chile as associate members, has also developed
deeply integrated interventionist structures in a range of policy fields. Also like the EU, its
original aims included the establishment of a common market where goods, capital, services, and
labor circulate freely. FRANCESCO DUINA, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF FREE TRADE: THE
EUROPEAN UNION, NAFTA, AND MERCOSUR 20 (2006). However, in the process of executing its
oversight duties, its regional directives have come to cover, as commentators have noted,
additional policy sectors as diverse as medical care, public spaces like airports, illegal drugs,
food, and more. Id. at 86. With respect to public health and food policy in particular, Mercosur
has gone beyond even the EC in the standardization of rules amongst member states relating to
the procedures and processes adhered to in the production of some goods, especially dairy
products. Id. at 116-30. In doing so, Mercosur has developed a sophisticated legal architecture
with harmonizing powers far beyond those provided by many other RIAs.
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policymaking frameworks. In particular, the U.S.-led free trade
agreements NAFTA and CAFTA exhibit few institutional organs with
policymaking authority, and the prospect of deepening integration
remains dubious.18 Nevertheless, the process in which all countries
are embracing some form of regional consolidation has made
tremendous strides and shows few signs of slowing. Nearly every
country belongs to at least one such bloc, and the scope of the alliances
increasingly extends beyond trade to include cooperation in such areas
as investment, competition, domestic regulation and policies,
standards, and even foreign policy.19
A variety of factors explains the surge in RIA popularity. One
important factor is the limited success that international actors have
had in achieving global reform. The inability of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), an international
organization designed to further market liberalization, to achieve a
global agreement on investment in 1998 legitimized newly created
RIAs, like NAFTA, which increased protections for foreign
investment. 20 Similarly, the persistent inability of the WTO to achieve
consensus among its members as to trade reform-demonstrated
recently in the breakdowns plaguing the organization's Doha Round of
trade talks-has led many countries to set upon more narrow paths of
21
consensus building, for which RIAs are increasingly important.
Because many governments are more familiar with (and at times
similar to) their neighbors than far-flung multilateral interlocutors,
RIAs are increasingly viewed as superior forums for promoting
liberalization along terms commensurate with their national
interests. 22 Administrators, cognizant of the trend, have further

18. Indeed, in the case of both NAFTA and CAFTA, the most important institutional
mechanisms are those pertaining to the implementation of investor-state dispute mechanisms.
See supra note 16.
19.

Id.

20. See Alex M. Niebruegge, Comment, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter
Treaty: The Yukos Arbitration and the Future Place of ProvisionalApplication in International
Law, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 355, 375 (2007) (noting the failure of the OECD in 1998).
21. The Doha round was launched in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, to lower trade barriers around
the world while accelerating the participation of the least-developed countries in the global
economy. Particular emphasis was placed on lowering tariff barriers and subsidies concerning
agricultural goods, a policy that met significant resistance by both the United States and the EU.
Ultimately, in July 2006, the parties failed to reach an agreement on the matter, resulting in the
formal suspension of trade talks. For an account of the various interests involved in the round's
collapse, see Peter Sutherland, The Doha Debacle, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2006, at A10.
22. See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism:A
New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARv. INT'L L.J. 419, 425 (2001) [hereinafter Cho,

Breaking the Barrier] ("Some economists argue that the geographical or regional concentration of
trade is attributable to the 'natural factor of geographical proximity.' ").
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situated RIAs as initial points of departure both for regional
policymaking 2 3 and for negotiations with third-party countries seeking
to affect multilateral liberalization through a gradual series of
24
regional agreements.
Regional integration has also been spurred by the apparent
success of European integration. Despite experiencing a variety of
political setbacks, the EU has created a powerful and prosperous
single market through the harmonization of its commercial policy. It
has also functioned as an effective mechanism through which
members have enhanced their collective voice and improved their
ability to articulate their interests with outsiders. Explicitly seeking to
mimic the success of European cooperation, governments throughout
Asia, Africa, and South America have embraced regional integration
as a means of ensuring both international relevance and enhanced
25
economies of scale.
2. The Multilateral Critique of Regional Integration
Despite their popularity with national governments, RIAs
comprise a hotly contested issue in the literature on international
economics. 26 In particular, scholars debate whether RIAs are merely
second-best alternatives to multilateralism, are stumbling blocks for

23. The EU, ASEAN, and Mercosur, in particular, operate as initial points of entry for
negotiation. For a discussion of the challenges facing such coordination in the EU and Mercosur,
see infra Parts II-III.
24. In order to restart the process, the WTO has initiated efforts at "quiet diplomacy" in
which WTO officials coordinate informal discussions with government officials and lawmakers of
the organization's various members. According to the WTO, full-fledged negotiations will only
come when members "put numbers to the flexibilities they have already expressed in general
terms on key issues." Pascal Lamay, Director-General, World Trade Organization, DirectorGeneral's Remarks at the Informal TNC (Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://www.wto.
org/english/news-e/news06_e/tnc-dg-stat_16nov06_e.htm.
25. Part of this response, some commentators suggest, has been not only emulative, but also
defensive in nature. In what has been termed the "domino theory" of regionalism, Richard
Baldwin has argued that some states enter into regional organizations because of the costs that
nonmembers bear when they are not part of the RIA. When more states join a particular RIA,
the costs of not participating grow, particularly when nonmembers are not able to enjoy some
kind of preferential treatment. These externalities often spur outsiders to form their own RIAs.
See generally Richard E. Baldwin, A Domino Theory of Regionalism, in EXPANDING MEMBERSHIP
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 25 (Richard E. Baldwin et al. eds., 1995). See also SCHIFF & WINTERS,
supra note 9, at 231 (summarizing Baldwin's argument and showing, among other things, how a
regionalized world may have less than benign effects where countries cannot form adequate
alliances).
26. See SCHIFF & WINTERS, supra note 9, at 10-11 (discussing the lack of consistency in the
vast range of empirical results regarding the merits of regionalism). For more on the reasons
behind the debate, see infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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multilateralism, or are valuable building blocks for multilateralism.
Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.
Perhaps the most dominant view in the literature is that RIAs
comprise, at best, a second-best option to global multilateralism. 27 For
these critics, three possible worlds exist. The first is a world of
ubiquitous tariffs, one in which no free trade exists. In such a world,
trade distortions such as tariffs and subsidies reduce global welfare,
raise costs of imports, and inefficiently allocate capital. An alternative
to this framework is the regionalized world, where existing members
of an RIA agree on lowered trade barriers among themselves, and, in
the case of a customs union, uniform tariffs regarding non-members.
In this regionalized scenario (the status quo), members reap the
benefits of cheaper goods, information spillovers from other investor
states, more efficient specialization, and the opportunity to
industrialize behind protective borders. The third option is
multilateralism, wherein all states join global agreements in which
tariffs are removed against any country that wishes to participate.
According to this view, regionalism presents a better alternative to
tariffs, though it is not as attractive as multilateralism. In a world of
open multilateral free trade, global participation would fully facilitate
consumer choice and maximize the competition faced by producers,
thereby creating efficiency gains. 28 However, in a regionalized world,
only members of the RIA are able to participate in the liberalized
trade regime. Regionalism is thus a necessarily limited form of
globalization, proffering only limited benefits and efficiency gains, as
outsiders to the RIA are excluded from participation.
More critical scholars contend that regionalism is not only a
less desirable form of economic cooperation, but also a "stumbling
block" to achieving multilateral free trade. 29 These critics argue that
RIAs cause a reduction in aggregate global welfare as they compete
with both non-member states and other RIAs and retain or raise

27. See Regionalism, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/thematic.htm (follow "Trade"
hyperlink; then select "Regionalism" from the "Select a Topic in Trade Research" pull-down
menu) (last visited Sept. 5, 2007) ("Given the very 'second best' nature of preferential trade
arrangements (PTAs), unlike global, multilateral trade liberalization, there are few universally
accepted rules of conduct that are applicable to all such arrangements."); see also Ken Heydon,
After

Cancun: The Danger of Second Best,

OECD

OBSERVER,

Dec.

2003, available at

http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/180 (predicting a "serious weakening" of the
multilateral trade system, since regionalism often entails "two-speed liberalisation" and "optouts" to open global trade, thereby creating vested interests that will make global free trade
even more difficult than it already is").
28. SCHIFF & WINTERS, supra note 9, at 23-25.
29. For another summary of the stumbling block thesis, see Cho, Breaking the Barrier,
supra note 22, at 430.
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higher tariffs against outsiders. 30 As political configurations, RIAs
fight for, and receive, exceptions in multilateral frameworks, thereby
3
softening the move towards fully comprehensive arrangements. '
Global welfare thereby is diminished because RIA-member products
are at least partially protected, irrespective of whether they are of the
same quality or their industries are as efficient as those of their nonmember counterparts. Consequently, these critics assert that RIAs do
not "create" trade by allowing cheaper products from bloc partners to
substitute for more expensive domestic production; instead, they
"divert" trade by substituting intra-bloc imports for what would
otherwise be imports from outside the group. 32 The distortions that
RIAs cause in the global trading system outweigh the efficiencies that
33
they create for members.
Drawing on the same tripartite vision of the world, other
academics view regionalism as a valuable liberalizing force. Along the
lines of a "building block" argument, regionalism paves the way for a
multilateral consensus by initially organizing protectionist states into
free-trade associations and breaking down many long-held market
distortions. Proponents of this view assert that RIAs not only
condition states for liberalization, but they also make members more

30. Id.
31. Specifically, as customs unions, RIAs comprise the main exception to the MFN
principle. WTO rules allow countries in RIAs to afford one another preferential treatment, so
long as the RIA meets certain conditions. The specific exception is memorialized under Article
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; Cho, Breaking the
Barrier,supra note 22, at 451. Namely, they must not on the whole raise protection against
excluded countries; they must reduce internal trade tariffs to zero and remove "other restrictive
regulations of commerce" other than those justified by other GATT articles; and they must cover
"substantially all the trade." GATT, supra. Though these requirements are not in themselves
easy to realize, countries that have undergone regional integration may view further competition
as undesirable, and thus find the RIA exception an attractive option. Jaime de Melo,
Regionalism and Developing Countries:A Primer,41 J. WORLD TRADE 351, 353 (2007).
32. See SCHIFF & WINTERS, supra note 9, at 33 (noting that the concepts of trade creation
and diversion continue to dominate the discussion of RIAs). This scenario would arise where, for
example, goods from outside the regional bloc would be cheaper if all suppliers faced the same
tariffs. Although goods from a member state inside the bloc would no longer face tariffs, the
member states would be granted a competitive edge. In such a circumstance, the importing,
preference-granting country absorbs increased costs, reducing marginal levels of efficiency.
These increased costs typically consist of more than just a wealth transfer from consumers in the
taxpaying state to the exporting state. Because the real cost of imports rises insofar as the
exporter is less efficient than the non-member state competitor, real resources are wasted by the
diversion. Id. at 13. See generally id. (providing a more recent critical account, noting how the
potentially beneficial (i.e. competitive) effects of regionalism are often subverted, creating trade
diversion).
33. Id.
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amenable to true multilateral trade.3 4 Some commentators
additionally have argued that even after the establishment of
multilateral agreements, regional initiatives often work to establish
rules not yet covered by multilateral platforms. 35 Regional agreements
involve a smaller number of players and interests, reducing the costs
of negotiation and making agreement easier to reach-even in areas
such as monetary policy and investment, which are harder to
negotiate multilaterally. 36 Once agreements are reached, they often
influence the multilateral system, either by example or where RIA
members push through the force of collective action for more liberal
sectoral reforms.37 For example, these commentators call attention to
the expansion of the WTO agenda to include new and more farreaching rules along the lines of RIA provisions,38 which suggests that
RIAs function as valuable policy transfer mechanisms. 39 Though
perhaps formally second-best options, they are an important, and
perhaps necessary, means to more optimal multilateral forms of open
free trade.
An end to the debate is unlikely. Distinguishing empirically
between trade creation and trade diversion is not straightforward
because it requires divining what trade would have looked like if no
RIA had been formed, as well as predicting the direction in which
regionalism will lead eventually. 40 Consequently, it is nearly
34. See, e.g., Robert Hormats, The Regional Way to Global Order, in THE GLOBAL AGENDA
(1995) (arguing that RIAs can be viewed as more feasible alternatives to complicated and costly
multilateral negotiations); Robert Z. Lawrence, Emerging Regional Arrangements: Building
Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?, in FINANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 26 (Richard O'Brien

ed., 1991) (arguing that RIAs provide a route for subsequent liberalization and growth among
member-states). This view is also the official view of the WTO, though its embrace of the treaties
reflects as much the fact that regional agreements are "here to stay." For a summary of the view
of the WTO Director-General, see Pascal Lamay, Director-General, World Trade Organization,
Regional Agreements: The 'Pepper' in the Multilateral 'Curry' (Jan. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl e/sppl53-e.htm.
35. Zdenek Drabek, Regionalism and Trade Discipline, in CAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION
ARRANGEMENTS

ENFORCE TRADE DISCIPLINE?: THE STORY OF EU ENLARGEMENT 59 (Zdenek

Drabek ed., 2005), availableat http://www.palgrave.com/pdfs/1403941602.pdf.
36. SCHIFF & WINTERS, supra note 9, at 113 ("RIAs allow countries to make commitments
on matters that are difficult to negotiate multilaterally .... ").
37. Lucian Cernat & Sam Laird, North, South, East, West: What's Best? Modern RTAs and
their Implications for the Stability of Trade Policy, in CAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION
ARRANGEMENTS ENFORCE TRADE DISCIPLINE?: THE STORY OF EU ENLARGEMENT, supra note 35,

at 73. The article is also available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/credit/research/
papers/CP.03.11.pdf.
38.

CERNAT & LAIRD, supra note 37, at 5.

39. Id.
40. See de Melo, supra note 31, at 353 ("[I]t is difficult to ascertain what trade policy the
member countries would have followed if they had not chosen a preferential approach to trade
policy (e.g., what agricultural policy would have emerged in Europe in the absence oF RTAS).").
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impossible to gauge the respective benefits and costs of the
phenomenon. However, commentators do agree on the immediate
salutary effects of what are referred to as "deeply integrated" or "deep
regional" economic blocs, which are dominated by the effects of the
41
member states' reduction of barriers against imports from outsiders.
Deep regionalism is generally described as a kind of integration that
exceeds tariff or market integration provided by free trade areas or
custom unions to encompass broad objectives such as competitive
government procurement, technological and scientific cooperation,
common competition policies, and monetary integration. 42 Economists
expect deep integration to proffer among member states' forms of
institutional cooperation that provide incentives to adhere to economic
liberalization. For example, deep integration requires forms of fiscal
discipline-such as inflation targeting, exchange rate anchors, and
debt controls-that minimize the incentives of countries to limit trade,
both directly and indirectly. 43 Furthermore, deep integration leads to
improved governance and transparency as members adopt common
rules on corporate behavior, trade, investment, and other commercial
matters.44 With the imposition of more unitary legal structures,
enforcement mechanisms characteristic of deep regionalism, and
higher levels of political commitments by states to the objectives of
integration, the benefits of such cooperation are apparent in both
45
regional and multilateral settings.
B. Why Bilateral Treaties Matter-andDon't Mix
1. The Overlooked Importance of Bilateral Integration
The conventional debate on the utility of regionalism is useful
insofar as it highlights the once-neglected tension between, and
challenges facing, regional and multilateral systems of economic

41. This is, perhaps, largely due to the fact that "[in recent years, both multilateralism and
regionalism evolved to steps towards integration that go beyond tariffs or non-tariff border
measures. Deep integration . . . is becoming an essential feature of both globalisation and
regionalisation .... " CERNAT & LAIRD, supra note 37, at 7.
42. Id.
43. Drabek, supra note 35, at 57.
44. See id. at 59. According to most economists, deep integration provides "scale and
competition gains" relevant to either context, even though it involves "far more complex
policymaking than would a looser free trade agreement." THE WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS 9
(2002), available at http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/TRC/Articles[RegionalismlTrade-Blocs-ChapOl.pdf
(internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 44.
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cooperation. Nevertheless, the descriptive theories promoted by both
critics and proponents of regionalism overlook a third crucial form of
economic
cooperation
and
liberalization
between
statesbilateralism-as well as the implications that regionalism holds for
bilateral instruments and alliances.46
The failure to address bilateralism comprehensively is
surprising given the increasing frequency with which states resort to
bilateral deals. 4 7 Especially popular are BITs, of which more than
2,265 have been signed since 1989,48 and BFTAs, whose aggregate
numbers have greatly increased in recent years to more than 200
today. 49 Like RIAs, these bilateral agreements regulate the treatment
of goods and capital between states through a series of MFN and
national treatment commitments between signatories-though each
covers only a slice of the various economic sectors covered by RIAs.
BITs regulate the treatment of investment and, like some RIAs, allow
investors to sue signatories where a party expropriates the assets of a
foreign investor. BFTAs, though at times containing provisions that
address investment (particularly in the absence of a BIT), generally
govern the treatment of goods. Both instruments reduce risk for
exporters of goods and capital and signal to investors-at times at
great costs to host states-a transparent and predictable regime for
the treatment of foreign capital and goods. They also entail even lower
negotiation costs than RIAs because they need to account for only two
parties' interests. Due in part to their simplicity, BITs and BFTAs

46. Though virtually no scholarship has addressed the relationship between bilateralism
and regionalism, a good deal of work has centered on the implications bilateralism holds for
multilateral institutions. Perhaps the most groundbreaking work has concerned what some
scholars describe as "nested bilateralism"-the use by governments of bilateral agreements
within larger multilateral frameworks, among other things, to forward multilateral objectives
(particularly liberalization). According to proponents in this field, "bilateral agreements can
substitute for multilateral treaties, with new bilateral understandings replacing those earlier
multilateral goals and outcomes." See John P. Willerton et al., Complex Security Institutions:
Nested Bilateralism in Commonwealth of Independent States, (Oct. 12-14, 2006), at 2 (on file
with author). Here, too, scholars collapse regionalism and multilateralism under one term"multilateralism"-and in so doing fail to chart a clear conceptual path for the study of the (at
times dissonant) interaction of bilateralism and regional integration.
47. Besides commercial agreements like trade and investment treaties, tax treaties,
commitments relating to extradition, judicial assistance, and even drug control are all routinely
executed on a bilateral basis.
48. United Nations Center on Trade and Development, BITs Database, http://www.unctad.
org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=3150&lang=1 (last visited Sept. 5, 2007) (indicating the
aggregate number of BITs in place between 1990 and 2002).
49. Alexander C. Chandra, Opinion, The Benefits and Dangers of Bilateral FTAs for
Indonesia, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=1066;
Robert McMahon, The Rise in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., June
13, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10890.
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have become two of the most popular legal mechanisms for promoting
economic discipline, as states and firms seek greater efficiencies and
economies of scale.
Everybody's Up To Something: A Sampling of Participation
In International Trade and Investment Agreements

United States
EU
Mexico
Japan
Singapore
South Africa
Jordan
India
Turkey

WTO?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

RIAs
2 (5*)
0 (7*)
6* (2)
0 (2*)
3* (1*)
4* (1*)
3*
5* (5*)
3* (2*)

BITs
48(l)
0
21 (1)
12
28
33
36
57 (2)
75

BFTAs
15(9)
32(4)
8(5)
8(8)
9 (12)
6(7)
3 (3)
9 (11)
17 (7)

Sources: Tuck5 0School of Business Trade Agreements Database, UNCTAD and
Bilaterals.org

One plausible explanation for the debate's lacuna is that
bilateralism is posited as a mode of international cooperation
indistinguishable from regionalism. For example, the WTO classifies51
BFTAs alongside regional accords as "regional trade agreements."
Similarly, the economics literature routinely identifies BITs and
BFTAs as sub-variants of regionalism because of their similar legal
mechanics and because many of their provisions have been
incorporated into broader regional agreements like NAFTA and
52
CAFTA.
Likewise, many scholars view bilateral agreements as less
effective than broader platforms at achieving international economic
discipline and, as a result, such agreements' potential as independent
governance mechanisms. Because bilateral agreements generally have
a more limited scope than multilateral arrangements, some
economists characterize them as "shallow" instruments of integration
50. The above table includes treaties that have not yet been notified to the WTO. For RIAs,
BITs, and BFTAs, parentheses "( )" indicate the number of agreements currently under
negotiation. Stars "*" indicate that at least one, and at most three, of the referenced treaties do
not involve membership in an RIA, but a country's liberalization agreement with an RIA.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
Agreements,
Trade
Regional
51. See
WTO,
region e/region e.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
52. See MAURICE W. SCHIFF & L. ALAN WINTERS, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 101 (2003) (noting that early RIA investment policies were "almost always
activist and interventionist").
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with limited utility for systems of international economic
53
governance.
Both of these views are largely inaccurate. As a matter of first
order principles, the bargaining dynamics in bilateral agreements are
very different from those driving regional treaties. 54 In a two-party
negotiation, the decision rule is simple: where both parties fail to
agree, there is an impasse. 55 As a result, a small state in a bilateral

negotiation has an important strategic disadvantage when bargaining
with a larger party-if it holds out, it stands to lose more if no
agreement is reached. 56 On the other hand, under multilateral
frameworks, subsets of negotiation parties-often similarly situated
groups or aligned developing countries-can, at least in theory, unite
in coalitions to buffer or promote member interests. 57 Consequently,
RIAs can increase welfare for members as a group-though as will be

SCHIFF & WINTERS, supra note 9, at 20.
54. For a comprehensive analysis of this dynamic, see Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for
Capital:The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811, 817 (2006),
which discusses how BITs have been primarily "agreements between countries of starkly varying
developmental levels and political traditions." This trend, however, has begun to change as an
increasing number of bilateral investment treaties have been formed between developing
countries. See The World Bank Group, International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, List of Parties to Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://www.worldbank.org
/icsid/treaties/intro.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2007) (providing a chronological list of BITs
concluded through the end of 1996 and listing articles and books dealing with BITs).
53.

55. Mary C. Kern et al., Shut Out of the Deal: The Impact of Communication Channels on
Efficiency
in
Multiparty
Negotiations
4
(unpublished manuscript),
available at

http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/deliberation/papers/diermeier.doc
(last visited Oct. 19,
2007).
56. Indeed, from the United States' perspective, many advocates of BITs view the
agreements as a kind of foreign aid. This is not to say, however, that all countries, particularly
quickly developing ones, are eager to enter into BITs. Particularly in Asia, successive rounds of
treaty negotiations between the U.S. and emerging economies in the region have ended in
failure. These states distinguish themselves from many least-developed countries insofar as they
"are sophisticated and independent enough to resist a U.S. dictation of terms." Michael R.
Reading, Note, The Bilateral Investment Treaty in ASEAN: A Comparative Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 679, 691 (1992). Still, their economic models do not allow them to adopt more open
investment policies. Id.
57. Of course, developed states, too, may impede multilateral liberalization, especially
where they fear the application of liberalization as applied to their own industries. This was the
case, for example, in the failed OECD-sponsored Multilateral Agreement on Investment ('MAI").
In this agreement, not only did developing countries have problems with various formulations
that they thought would impede national sovereignty and regulatory prerogatives, but also

Canada and France objected to the measures out of a fear that an unrestricted capital market
would potentially lead to the swamping of their cultural industries by the U.S. entertainment
industry. As will be seen below, this is a recurring issue in multilateral forums. M. SORNARAJAH,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 291-97 (2004); see also infra Part II.A.2
(discussing EU protection of audio-visual services).
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seen in Part III, these gains may not be distributed evenly due to
58
unequal power relationships within the group.
Additionally, bilateral agreements are potent integration
instruments that often provide for deeper economic commitments than
do regional agreements. Although RIAs have a broader scope and may
touch on more diverse sectors like tax and intellectual property,
bilateral instruments often provide for greater liberalization in the
sectors they do touch. As noted above, bilateral agreements involve a
smaller number of players than regional accords, further reducing
negotiation costs and making agreement more tenable as parties can
determine more concretely the benefits of liberalization. Furthermore,
the more the strategic disadvantages arising where small players
engage larger ones contribute to potentially deeper commitments to
liberalization than would otherwise arise regionally-though even
within RIAs power asymmetries may flourish between members.
Thus although bilateral agreements, like many regional
frameworks, may adhere to principles such as MFN and national
treatment, they may do so more comprehensively than some RIAs and
apply the standards to more stages of investment. 59 Often, they also
include fewer sectoral opt-outs and exemptions. As a result, bilateral
agreements differentiate relationally from RIAs in a manner unlike
that of RIAs vis-A-vis multilateral regimes. RIAs often are more
protectionist than multilateral initiatives like the WTO. On the other
hand, bilateral investment and trade instruments, despite comprising
disaggregated commitments involving fewer players, often are more
liberal than their regional counterparts.
Importantly, even bilateral instruments that provide for
economic commitments that do not deviate substantively from RIAs
may still conflict with the political objectives of RIAs or their member
states. Both classical and neo-functional theories on trade, along with
58. By way of example, only two RIAs-NAFTA and CAFTA-provide for unilateral dispute
resolution against the host state at the insistence of the foreign investor where a cause of action
arises, which is a common feature of many BITs. Furthermore, other RIAs, such as ASEAN,
directly regulate investment even among their members, but do not provide other common
features of U.S. BITs, such as the inclusion of portfolio investment under the definition of
"investment," or the pre-establishment of national treatment of foreign investment. Id. at 304,
321. Because of the relative strength of BITs, they have been the preferred instrument of the
United States. Even in multilateral negotiations such as the MAI, the U.S. government has
striven to make clear that BITs would continue to be in effect.
59. This is particularly evident in bilateral investment treaties, which extend deeper
protections than those available under most regional umbrellas. See LUKE ERIK PETERSON, INT'L
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY-

MAKING 3 (2004), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/tradebits.pdf (noting that some
BITs-especially those championed by the U.S., Canada, and Japan-may extend protections
prior to the establishment of the investment in the host state's territory).
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history, suggest that plurilateral integration by states in one sector
often necessitates further action, often political, in related ones (such
as investment). 60 These spillovers 6 1 push international bureaucratic
organizations, including RIAs, to take on political identities. For
example, the EC was originally a customs union but developed into an
internal market in which the free movement of goods, and eventually
services, between member states was envisioned, along with the
protectionist policies applied against outsiders. Common trade policy
then led to deeper financial integration and monetary union.62 Finally,
under the framework provided by economic integration, shared
concerns regarding security and globalization led to integration in
other sectors, 63 often with the explicit aim of establishing Europe at
the forefront of international politics. This trajectory is not confined to
Europe, and many RIAs, such as the AU and Mercosur, have adopted
socio-political institutions and agendas with advanced strategic
interests and often considerable sophistication. 64
The theoretical point is that in the face of regional political
integration, bilateral instruments-particularly those crafted between
members, or aspiring members, of RIAs and third-party countries60. Richard Morrison, Efficient Breach of InternationalAgreements, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 183, 220 (1994).
61. Id.
62. Ben Rosamond, Regional Integration in Europe and Asia, in SOCIAL CHANGES IN ASIA
AND EUROPE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION (Trond Gilberg & Ulrich Niemann eds., 2001) 144,
144-50, available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN
004892.pdf.
63. See SCHIFF & WINTERS, supra note 9, at 7-9 (listing explicitly stated objectives for
regionalism by politicians and in investment instruments themselves).
64. For example, the AU, which was established in 1994 to replace the more loosely aligned
Organization of African Unity, has embraced the political integration of the continent as an
express objective. Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, Organization of
African
Unity
(OAU)/African
Union
(AU),
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/
africa/oau.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007). Modeled largely after the EU and adopting such
institutions as a Commission, Council, Parliament, and Court of Justice, it actively advances
policies concerning not only economic development, but also international affairs, security, and
defense. Id. In South America, too, both the Andean Group and Mercosur have evolved over time
to encompass not only free trade areas, but also political fields. Mercosur, in particular, expressly
looks back to colonial exploitation and what many leaders view as a backwards heritage of
European and North American domination in order to develop its economic policy and foster
economic and social development. Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira, Mercosur: Political
Development and Comparative Issues with the European Union, 5 JEAN MONNET/ROBERT
SCHUMAN PAPER SERIES, July 2005, at 2, available at http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/
guedesfinal.pdf. As a result, the organization has taken a variety of steps to eschew and diminish
American influence in the region, and is largely viewed as a rival to the U.S.-led Free Trade Area
of the Americas. Eduardo Gudynas, MERCOSUR and the FTAA: New Tensions and New
Options, INTERHEMISPHERIC RESOURCE CTR., Nov. 11, 2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/
econ2003/llllmercosurftaa.htm; see also infra Part II.B (describing tensions between Brazil,
Argentina, and Venezuela, and the United States).
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may not be commensurate with, or even consider, regional political
expectations or legal requirements. Unlike RIAs, which frequently
double as customs unions, cultural alliances, and economic clubs,
bilateral instruments are not designed to keep non-participants out
and are anything but exclusive arrangements. Instead, they create
open, nondiscriminatory policies and allow any non-participant, even
potential rivals to RIAs and member states, to enter into agreements
that provide equal access to member-state markets. In doing so,
bilateral initiatives may undo intrastate pacts, and even common
foreign policy initiatives, agreed on by member states of regional
organizations.
2. The Potential Incongruity of Regional and Bilateral Treaties
As a matter of predictive theory, how RIAs respond to
structural inconsistency will be context dependent. Important factors
likely will include the characteristics of the RIA itself, the type of
bilateral agreement that creates the structural inconsistency, and the
nature of the third-party state involved in the transaction. Regarding
the first factor, some RIAs foreclose independent economic
commitments with third-party countries, which this Article defines as
"closed" regional organizations. Thus, where inconsistencies arise
between bilateral and regional frameworks, member states or, if
applicable, the RIA executive organ, may take formal legal or political
action to enforce compliance and induce uniformity among all member
states. On the other hand, other "open" RIAs may have only diffuse or
indirect decisionmaking apparatuses and may lack a clear policy
regarding uniformity. Consequently, states are empowered, at least
legally, to adopt their own economic policies and accords with thirdparty countries. Nevertheless, strong member-state preferences,
political constellations, or institutional norms still may pull members
towards collective action. In such circumstances, where states choose
to opt for bilateralism, they may face significant political or
reputational costs.
As for the second factor-the type of bilateral agreement-the
institutional design of most RIAs suggests that, of the major bilateral
instruments promulgated by states, trade treaties create the most
likely prospects for structural inconsistency with RIAs. Most RIAs are
founded as free trade areas-where states merely commit to lowering
tariffs amongst each other-or, to a significantly lesser extent, as
customs unions. Few have wrested control of additional economic
domains from member states. As a result, although there is a greater
number of BITs, which suggests superficially that such agreements
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are the most frequent source of tension, these accords lay beyond the
competence of most RIAs. This is not to say that disputes will not
arise in the investment context, as the EU Enlargement example,
infra Part II.A demonstrates. But it does suggest that regional
organizations are currently more permissive toward divergent
investment policies than toward divergent trade policies.
What's Kept Out?: Comparison of Trade and Investment
Policies of Selected Regional Organizations
RIA
EC
Caribbean Community
and Common Market

NAFTA

Closed Trade Policy? 65 Closed Investment Policy?
Yes 67
Yes 66
69
No
Yes 66
No 7 0

No71

65. This was determined by searching whether the particular RIA had a customs union. If
so, the RIA was listed as having a closed trade policy.
66. See Steve Peers, Living in Sin: Legal Integration Under the EC-Turkey Customs Union,
7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 411, 411, 429 (1996) (noting that the EC entered into a formal customs union
with Turkey on Dec. 31, 1995, a process that paralleled the EC's own development in prior
years).
67. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the EC's investment policy and its potential conflict
with BITs by member nations).
68. See Christopher Lion, Regional Trade Agreements in the Western Hemisphere, Bus. AM.,
Dec. 1994, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m1O52/is n12 v115/ai_15976005
("Despite its name, CARICOM currently operates as a customs union and not a common
market.").
69. Many CARICOM member states have entered into various BITs individually, distinct
from those BITs entered into between CARICOM, on behalf of its member states, and another
nation. Thus, it can be inferred that CARICOM does not preclude member countries from
entering into investment treaties on their own accord. See, e.g., UN Conference on Trade &
Development, Total Number of Bilateral Investment Agreements Concluded, Antigua and
Barbuda, June 1, 2006, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditepcbb/docs/antigua.pdf
[hereinafter UNCTAD] (BIT with Germany and the United Kingdom); UNCTAD, supra,
Jamaica, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-pcbb/docs/jamaica.pdf (BITs in force
with ten nations); UNCTAD, supra, Trinidad and Tobago, available at http://www.unctad.org/
sections/dite pcbb/docs/Trinidado20ando2OTobago.PDF (BITs with seven nations).
70. See Rolf Mirus, Should We Trade NAFTA for a Customs Union?, U. ALTA. EXPRESS
NEWS, Nov. 30, 2001, http://www.expressnews.ualberta.ca/article.cfm?id=1538 (discussing that a
customs union should take the place of NAFTA).
71. See Ernest H. Preeg, A New World Economic Strategy, J. COM., May 17, 1995, at 8A
("NAFTA's investment provisions are a model for the OECD agreement shows that an open
investment policy can be beneficial to developing and developed countries."). Given the
contemporaneous presence of the United States and Mexico as NAFTA members, and the
contrasting number of BITs to which each is a party, there may be an especially wide divergence
of investment policies in this context. See supra note 50 and accompanying table (indicating that
the United States is party to over twice as many BITs as is Mexico); see also UNCTAD, supra
note 69, Canada, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditepcbb/docs/canada.pdf (party to
BITs with twenty-three nations).
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Yes 72

No7 3

74

No75

No

Development Community
Finally, structural inconsistencies most likely will arise and be
more acute where third-party states to regional organizations are
large or economically powerful. Large states have a substantial
economic impact no matter their trading partner. Where one country
has superior or privileged access over other similarly situated
countries, the impact of any trade advantage will be greater with
respect to regional partners. Thus, it is with large states that the
structural inconsistency problem will be most acute. In this context,
choices between regional and bilateral regimes become difficult, and
the political and economic rivalries (and passions) are fierce. Again,
this is not to say that RIAs or their member states will not enforce
economic treaties with weak states. Indeed, RIAs or their constituent
members may enforce such treaties as a matter of principle or to avoid
precedent permitting regional deviations that could incentivize similar
defections with larger states in the future. Nonetheless, in many
cases, the political and economic costs of enforcement may outweigh
the benefits of achieving compliance, which may encourage a lessthan-robust regional response when a third party is a weak state.
This observation has, of course, particular salience for the
United States, which is not only the largest economy in the world, but
72.
Under Mercosur Resolution 32, member states individually cannot negotiate trade or
economic agreements with other countries without first attempting to create consensus among
members. This legal barrier has caused considerable challenges in the trade context. See infra
Part II.B.2.
73. It is important to note, however, that although Mercosur Resolution 32 states that
members individually cannot negotiate trade or economic agreements with other countries, many
members have nonetheless entered into various BITs individually. See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra
note 69, Uruguay, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-pcbb/docs/uruguay.pdf
(showing twenty-six BITs between Uruguay and other nations); UNCTAD, supra note 69,
Paraguay, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditepcbb/docs/paraguay.pdf (BITs in force
with twenty nations). Thus, it can be inferred that, in contrast to the trade context, Resolution
32 does not preclude, as a practical matter, member countries from entering into investment
treaties on their own accord, even though it may be illegal as a matter of RIA law.
74. See Barbara Among, We Are Committed to the East African Federation Plans, Says
Kikwete, EAST AFR. (Kenya), Nov. 28, 2006 ("Tanzania and the SADC resolved to establish a
Customs Union by 2010.").
75. Many SADC member states have entered into various BITs individually, distinct from
those BITs entered into between SADC, on behalf of its member states, and another nation.
Thus, it can be inferred that SADC does not preclude member countries from entering into
investment treaties on their own accord. See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra note 69, Swaziland, available
at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-pcbb/docs/swaziland.pdf (BITs in force with Germany and
the United Kingdom); UNCTAD, supra note 69, South Africa, available at http://www.
unctad.org/sections/ditepcbb/docs/south-africa.pdf (BITs in force with nineteen countries).
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has pushed bilateral liberalization schemes most aggressively in the
last ten years, as the executive's trade promotion authority heads
toward expiration. 76 And it is indeed no coincidence that the two case
studies discussed infra Part II-which illustrate the problem of
structural inconsistency in two different sectors in two very different
parts of the world-involve U.S. economic and political interests.
Nevertheless, it is premature to view structural inconsistency as a
purely "American" problem. Traditionally, many of the world's largest
and most rapidly growing economies have shielded their domestic
industries from outside competition and thus have avoided entering
77
into bilateral agreements with robust reciprocal obligations.
However, as most of these countries increasingly adopt more
externally oriented policies, they, too, may be exposed to similar legal
and political challenges when engaging states that are members of
tightly knit RIAs.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: Two CASE STUDIES

As a new descriptive theory, the above account warrants
careful corroboration. Therefore, this Part considers two instances
where structural inconsistency has informed international economic
law. The first case study examines the EC's call in 2004 for accession
candidates to terminate their BITs with the United States because the
treaties were economically more liberal than existing EC policy. In
doing so, it illustrates how structural inconsistency can arise in
"closed" RIAs-institutions requiring legal consistency among
members. The second case study features Venezuela's attempts to use
the Andean Community's regional norms and laws to obstruct its
regional partners from entering into free trade agreements with the
United States. This case illustrates the political obstacles to bilateral
cooperation that may arise even in "open" RIAs, which, at least
formally, permit member states to enter into independent agreements.

76. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has been trying to sign a variety of bilateral
agreements, including BFTAs, with a diverse list of countries including Korea, Malaysia,
Thailand, Ecuador, Panama, and the United Arab Emirates. See Cho, Defragmenting,supra note
9 ("The United States' recent aggressive bilateral/regional drive worldwide has put East Asian
trading partners in a protective position.").
77. In part, this stems from long-held views of underdevelopment, namely the view that
"the international capitalist economy operates systematically to underdevelop and distort the
economies of the less developed economies." See ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 273 (1987) (noting that many countries believe that underlying the
"terms of trade between advanced and less-developed countries are ... biased against the latter"
and characterized by "unequal exchange").
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A. U.S. Investment Treaties in Europe
1. EC Laws Implicating Foreign Direct Investment
One of the most dramatic clashes between bilateral and
regional instruments arose in 2004, when the EC demanded that
countries seeking EC membership denounce bilateral investment
treaties that they had signed with the United States in the early
1990s. 78 The EC announced that the treaties, which broadly
prohibited, among other things, discrimination against foreign
investment, violated European (protectionist) laws that had governed
the region's economic policies for nearly fifty years. At the time a
source of considerable tension in EU-U.S. economic relations, the
impasse illustrates many of the theoretical underpinnings and
practical implications of structural inconsistency.
To explain the logic driving the EC's demand that accession
candidates denounce their BITs, it is necessary to outline some of the
EC's laws governing foreign direct investment ("FDI"). Despite the
deep integration typified by the EC, the organization lacks a single,
explicit statute for the treatment of FDI 79 Instead, FDI is addressed
78. No official protocol was published, although industry analysts closely followed the
demand, which was eventually subject to congressional review. See U.S.-Bulgaria Investment
Treaty Additional Protocol Sent to Senate, USINFO, Jan. 22, 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/
xarchives/listprod.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=January
(go
to
"U.S.-Bulgaria
Investment Treaty Additional Protocol Sent to Senate" hyperlink under "22 Jan 2004")
(describing President George W. Bush's requests to the Senate regarding approval of
modifications to bilateral investment treaties with eastern European countries necessary to
resolve "incompatibilities" given their "future obligations of EU membership").
79. Although Article 57 of the EC Treaty after Maastricht (also known as the Treaty on the
European Union) indicates that the EC's Council of Ministers may, with certain restrictions,
adopt measures on the movement of direct investment, Treaty on the European Union tit. II, art.
G, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, the EC's authority over FDI frequently has been interpreted
as limited. In particular, scholarly and practical focus has been placed on the extent to which
fundamental EC authority is conveyed through the exclusive competency the EC wields over
"commercial policy"-under which the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has found investment
to fall only partially. See Opinion 1/94, Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty, 1994
E.C.R. 1-5267 (holding that both the EC and member states were jointly competent to conclude
the General Agreement on Trade and Services, an agreement that partially covers investment as
an element of services provision). Attempts have been made to bring investment more directly
under the scope of commercial policy. Most recently, Article 1-13 of the failed European
Constitution would have extended the definition of common commercial policy to include FDI
(Article 111-315). Europa: A Constitution for Europe, The Policies of the Union,
http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/external-en.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007). Prior to that
point, during the Nice Summit, Finland sought more expansive language in Article 133 to grant
the EC exclusive competence in intellectual property and investment. Horst Guenter Krenzler &
Christian Pitschas, Progress or Stagnation?: The Common Commercial Policy after Nice, 6 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REV., 291, 294 (2001). Internal squabbling between the different EC member
states, however, regarding other provisions in the suggested language, along with a strong
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only indirectly by the EC in regional programs and multilateral
agreements in which the EC participates. Perhaps most important is
the Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"), a regional program adopted
in 1962, which requires EC members to apply an agreed on set of
tariffs, investments, and subsidies in their respective agricultural
markets.8 0 The program is a response to, and a product of, the political
realities of Western European countries shortly after World War II. In
exchange for its early support of a common market, France insisted on
a system of deep agricultural subsidies. The CAP, at that time a
means of rehabilitating the continent's decimated agricultural
81
industry, was viewed as a mechanism for facilitating such support.
However, the CAP has removed virtually all foreign competition over
time and has caused Europe's agricultural sector to become inefficient
and outdated. Europe's food prices are now among the highest in the
world,8 2 and the EC's investment in farm subsidies alone takes up
83
almost half of the EC's eighty-five billion Euro annual budget.
Nevertheless, the CAP remains notoriously difficult to reform, largely
due to the resistance by France, which still receives over twenty
84
percent of the program's funds.
Another significant framework impacting investment in
Europe is the General Agreement in Trade and Services ("GATS"),85 a
multilateral treaty that the EC signed alongside its individual
member states in 1994 as part of the WTO's Uruguay Round. s6 Under
predilection against the formal forfeiture of national prerogative, forced the tabling of such an
agreement. Id..
80. GATT is largely inapplicable as agriculture is removed from several of the agreement's
customary trade provisions. Agriculture is instead accorded exceptional treatment under Articles
VI, XI, XVI and XX, which together prohibit quantitative restrictions other than tariffs on the
importation and exportation of products and allow different treatment for "primary" and "nonprimary" products. GATT, supra note 31, arts. VI, XI, XVI, XX.
81.

WILLIAM

WALLACE,

HELEN WALLACE

& MARK POLLACK,

POLICY-MAKING

IN THE

EUROPEAN UNION 183-84 (5th ed. 2000).
82. Id. at 167 (noting that under the CAP, domestic food prices are often double world
prices).
83. See Q&A: Common Agricultural Policy, BBC NEWS, Dec. 2, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/4407792.stm (commenting that the EU will spend 46% of its budget in 2005 on
agriculture subsidies under the CAP).
84. In 2003, under the British EU Presidency, France reached an agreement on CAP
reforms. This ostensibly ambitious agenda had, however, preserved the underlying framework
for CAP subsidies. EU Agrees 'Radical' Farm Reform, BBC NEWS, June 26, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ihi/business/3021728.stm.
85. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter "GATS"].
86. Importantly, GATS is not an agreement on investment as such. It addresses investment
as one of several different ways of gaining access to a market, insofar as the investment
comprises service "through commercial presence" in a member state. SORNARAJAH, supra note
57, at 299-300.
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the terms of the GATS, which does not speak to agriculture, EC
members committed to applying MFN and national treatment
standards to their trade in services (and the investment therein).
Under the MFN standard, "any benefit or concession with regard to
trade in services covered by the GATS, whether granted unilaterally
or negotiated bilaterally or plurilaterally," must be extended
unconditionally to all other signatories to the treaty.8 7 Similarly,
under the national treatment criteria, the GATS requires each
signatory to "accord to services and service suppliers of any other
Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services,
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers."8 8
These obligations are not, however, universally applicable.
Aware of the potentially significant implications of universal
liberalization of its services sectors, the EC, like other signatories,
exercised rights under the GATS to opt out of liberalizing economically
sensitive sectors in which there were important strategic interests or
where European businesses were uncompetitive.8 9 Two sectors are
worth highlighting for illustrative purposes. The first is the air-androad transport services exemption, which was a response to the EC's
policy of protecting European domestic markets from infiltration by
87. Martin Roy, A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions, Office of the Secretary General of
the OECD, at 5 (2001), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2001doc.nsf/ (search "Date";
then select "Search"; then insert "A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions"; then select article in
English).
88. GATS, supra note 85, art. XVII.
89. The GATS permits signatories to tailor liberalization according to their own interests.
Id. pt. IV. MFN is, in principle, mandatory, though members may opt out of the obligation for
specific sectors on the basis of existing preferences. Id. art. II, annex II. Similarly, national
treatment obligations are not mandatory at all, but instead require opting in by sector. Id. pt. III.
This means each country negotiates its concessions with other signatories, and files an
individual schedule of national treatment commitments. Each country's schedule is then
annexed according to Article II of the GATS and is incorporated into the agreement. As the
Working Party of the Trade Committee from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development notes:
The GATS permits some important permanent derogations to the application of the
MFN obligation. The first of these relates to benefits conferred pursuant to economic
integration agreements (Article V) [such as the Treaty of Amsterdam or the NAFTA]
and labour market integration agreements (Article V his). Parties to such integration
agreements can be exempted from the MFN obligation, provided the agreement in
question meets the criteria set out in Article V and V his, e.g., substantial sectoral
coverage and the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination. Article VII
on recognition also allows members to conclude certain recognition agreements on a
non-MFN basis, whereas Article XIII on government procurement provides for an
exception to the MFN obligation.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., WORKING PARTY OF THE TRADE COMM., TRADE IN
SERVICES: A ROADMAP TO GATS MFN EXEMPTIONS 5 (2001), available at http://www.olis.

oecd.org/olis/200ldoc.nsf/LinkTo/td-tc-wp(2001)25-final.
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foreign airlines services. Though in favor of creating a "free
international EC aviation market" both to bring about free access to
all destinations within the EC and to provide synergy between
European airlines, the EC-sponsored trend of liberalization had not
extended to lowered barriers between the United States and
individual member states. 90 EC policymakers believed that "European
carriers [were] in danger of being legally, commercially, and
airpolitically overwhelmed by the [United States]" and its carriers. 9 1
Consequently, until recently the EC has sought to fend off U.S.
market penetration through bilateral air transport agreements with
individual countries and has traditionally resisted liberalization in the
92
sector.
The EC also opted out of applying MFN and national treatment
in audio-visual services. This exemption, referred to as the "cultural
exception," is an outgrowth of the EC's Television Without Frontiers
Directive, which provides that "member states shall ensure where
practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve
for European works ... a majority proportion of their transmission
time . . . ,,93 The opt-out facilitates this objective, as local content
requirements and subsidies are consequently permitted in the
production and broadcasting of audio-visual works. The purpose
behind this policy is ostensibly to promote national cultural values of
EC member states and to preserve linguistic and cultural diversity in
Europe.9 4 However, there are also strong economic considerations.
Over the last fifty years, the audio-visual goods and services sector
has developed alongside other types of trade, with the United States
90.

H. Peter van Fenema, The Liberalization of Air Transport Services in the European

Union: Some Recent Developments in the Field of EC External Relations, in THE USE OF AIR AND
OUTER SPACE COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 87-88 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 1998).

91. Id. at 91. According to the European Commission, the U.S.-sponsored open-skies system
distorts and fragments the European single market because each European country is acting
only in its own interests, rather than in the best interests of the market. Barry James, EU Court
Strikes Down Aviation Accords with U.S.; Open-Skies Pacts Stifle Competition, It Says, INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 6, 2002, at 1. Furthermore, by opening up access to flights in some

countries, non-participating countries would be discriminated against. Daniel Dombey, Complex
EU Legal Net Closes in On Aviation Deals, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at 8.

92. This resistance shows signs of loosening as both the EC and the United States, in
principle, have agreed to the idea of opening access to airline markets. Both sides have, however,
been unable to negotiate concrete guidelines. See Bengt Ljung, U.S., EU Fail to Reach Deal On
Open Skies, INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY, Jan. 12, 2007 ("[The] U.S. and EU negotiators made no

progress January 11 in the stalled talks on liberalizing trans-Atlantic air travel ....).
93. Council Directive 89/552, art. 4, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23 (EC), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/implementation/promotion/index-en.htm.
94. Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The CulturalException: Does It Exist in GATT and
GATS Frameworks? How Does It Affect or Is It Affected By The Agreement on TRIPS?, 15
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 283 (1997).
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represent eighty percent of

the films distributed in European movie theaters, and over fifty-five
percent of the films shown on European television networks." 95 As a
result, U.S. businesses largely have viewed the program as a pretext
for establishing protectionist trade barriers against U.S. goods in a
96
crucial area of trade.
Like the CAP, the regional programs shielded through the
GATS exemptions have special beneficiaries. The United Kingdom has
benefited greatly from the air and transport services exemption, with
Heathrow Airport, Europe's busiest airport, closed to competition from
most U.S. carriers. 97 As a result, the United Kingdom has maintained
longstanding policies denying market access without reciprocal
inroads into U.S. markets. 98 Similarly, French businesses benefit
disproportionately from the cultural exception as the country has one
of the most protectionist audio-visual policies in Europe-no more
than forty percent of television programs are permitted to be of nonEuropean origin, and French law requires television channels to
invest fifteen percent of their turnover in the production of "original
French works." 99
2. The "Termination" and Subsequent Amendment of U.S. BITs
Until 2004, the CAP, the GATS, and the regional initiatives
underlying the GATS exceptions had implicated only the relations of
the fifteen original EC member states with outsiders, including the
United States. However, on May 1, 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia joined the EC, thereby becoming subject to the dictates of EC
law. 100

This regime change required some adjustment for the new
member countries, particularly in the field of investment. Up to that

95. Id. at 281.
96. Id. at 283.
97. See U.S.-E. U. Open Skies Agreement: With a Focus on DOT's NPRM Regarding 'Actual
Control" of U.S. Air CarriersBefore the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Trans. and
Infrastructure, 109th Cong. (2006) (statements of Jeffrey Smisek, President, Continental
Airlines, Inc., and Michael G. Whitaker, Vice President, United Airlines World Headquarters).
98. Id. (referencing the UK's policy).
99. Karen Rinaman, French Film Quotas and Cultural Protectionism, http://www.
american.edu/ted/frenchtv.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2007).
100. State Department: U.S., European Union Agree on Trade Concessions Tied to European
Union Expansion, U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 1, 2005 (citing Press Release, U.S. Trade
Representative, U.S. and European Communities Reach Agreement on Enlargement
Compensation Package (Nov. 30, 2005)).
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point, investment policy towards the United States had been governed
primarily by bilateral treaties enacted in the early 1990s. 10 1 Eager for
capital, Eastern European countries wanted to become more attractive
destinations for American capital. And, like many other nations at the
time, most thought that one way to do this-as well as sustain U.S.
interest in the area-was to enter into two-party commitments with
the United States, informing investors that they would not change the
10 2
conditions of investment once it was made.
Whatever their merits, the BITs created legal obligations that
ultimately surpassed the GATS regime. Substantively, the BITs
pushed the core principles of MFN, national treatment, and free
access even further than the GATS, as they did not adopt exceptions
for audio-visual services or agricultural investment.1 0 3 Consequently,
the BITs did not permit government intervention (e.g., subsidies) or
discriminatory treatment towards investors. Furthermore, the BITs
extended national treatment protection to the pre-establishment stage
GATS, thereby limiting the ability of host states to impose preinvestment conditions on investment within their borders. Again, no
comparable provisions for third-party countries existed in the audiovisual directives, "internal" regional investment regimes like the CAP,
or sectoral opt-outs under the GATS. Instead, European countries had
opted out of such concessions consistently and were positioned to
extract maximum rents from potential foreign investors in their
10 4
agreements with third parties.
101. Eastern European countries, free to follow their own economic and foreign policy,
overwhelmingly flocked to bilateral investment treaties (BITs), with eight countries signing BITs
within five years of independence. For a discussion of the general content of the treaties, see
Nancy Goodman, International Trade: Poland Bilateral Investment Treaty-A Reflection of
United States Efforts to Shape the Economic Development of Eastern Europe, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J.
255, 259 (1991).
102. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave,
14 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 621, 634 (1993) ("[The treaties] would serve as a symbol that these [Eastern
European] States had embraced the pro-market economic policy endorsed by the United States,
which could, in turn, attract private investment to these States.").
103. However, some BITs, like Poland's, contain exceptions to national treatment and MFN
as pertaining to air and rail transportation. See Luke Eric Peterson, EU- US Agree to Alter US
BITs With EU Accession Candidates,INVESTMENT L. & POL'Y WKLY. NEWS BULL., Sept. 19, 2003,
at 1, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment-investsdsepl9-2003.pdf ("Inside US
Trade reports that the areas which will now be exempted from national treatment provisions are:
'agriculture; audiovisual; securities; investment and other financial services; fisheries;
hydrocarbons; subsidies; and three different modes of transport: air carrier; inland waterways
and maritime.' ").
104. Indeed, prior European BITs consistently refused to adopt many of the commitments
forwarded in U.S.BITs, though their refusal ostensibly aided developing countries. See, e.g.,
Patricia Robin, The BIT Won't Bite: The American Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 33 AM.
U. L. REV. 931, 957 (1984) (noting how Western European countries do not request screening
prohibitions).
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These inconsistencies raised complex legal questions as to the
viability of the BITs under EC law. 0 5 A fundamental premise of the
EC is member commitment to the basic constitutional structure, laws,
and policies of the EU and the EC, collectively termed the acquis
communitaire.10 6 Because the EC is a closed RIA, applicant nations
must accept this commitment to join. 10 7 In addition, where either a
member or a candidate exercises authority in an area in which the
Community has concluded a treaty in pursuance of a common policy, it
08
will be overridden to the extent that it conflicts with EC law. 1
Closely related to this broad doctrine of preemption is the
required uniformity of a "common commercial policy." Ex-Article 116
obliges member states to act in concert when matters of particular
interest to the common market arise in international economic
organizations. 10 9 And under the current Article 133, the EC demands
that the common commercial policy "be based on uniform principles,
particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff
and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of
liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such as
those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.""10 As an
element of EC commercial policy, the GATS constitutes an
authoritative framework for investment and trade."' Consequently,
the BITs negotiated with EC accession candidates were required to
conform to common EC objectives and policies. Against the backdrop
of these regional legal requirements, the European Commission
105. See U.S., EU Struggle to Solve Fight over Bilateral Investment Deals, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
(D.C.), Oct. 11, 2002, at 5 [hereinafter Fight over Bilateral Investment Deals].
106. Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedurefor the Central
Europeanand MediterraneanStates, 1 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 15, 15 (2004-2005).
107. Id.
108. See id. at 33-36 (explaining the role of the acquis communautaire principle in the
accession of new member states to the EU). This principle has been applied to existing EC
member states in the course of several cases by the ECJ. In the first important case to articulate
the principle, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos Onderneming v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, the ECJ ruled that the aim of creating a uniform common market
between different states would be undermined if Community laws could be made subordinate to
national laws. The principle was then applied to countries acceding to the EC in the course of the
1969 and 1974 accession talks, during which the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland were
informed by the EC's Council of Ministers that they had to adopt the EC's treaties and policies in
order to initiate accession negotiations. According to the then-President of the Council, Foreign
Minister Harmel of Belgium, any problems of adjustment could be sought in "transitional
measures" and "not in changes of existing rules," thereby making adoption of the acquis a
condition that has been imposed in all subsequent accessions. Id. at 34.
109. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10,
1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3.
110. Id.
111. See Fight over BilateralInvestment Deals, supra note 105, at 6.
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("Commission"), charged with ensuring both adherence to the acquis
and uniformity of commercial policy with third-party countries,
112
declared the treaties in violation of "EC Law."
The Commission consequently informed member states that
the treaties would have to be terminated for candidate states to gain
admission to the EC. However, American interests met this call with
considerable outcry, and the Commission ultimately attenuated its
position, albeit only slightly in some regards. 113 Instead of requiring
termination, the Commission declared that all incompatible BIT
provisions would have to be removed from the treaties for states. After
the Commission presented a confidential list of potential conflicts
between the BITs and EC law to the United States, the BIT
signatories amended the instruments, removing the incompatible
11 4
provisions identified by the Commission.
Tellingly, the actual amendments focused almost entirely on
the preservation of protectionist policies already in place in Western
Europe. Accession candidates were allowed, for example, to impose EU
performance requirements in a variety of sectors including
agricultural and audio-visual services, although existing investors in
11 5
affected sectors were granted ten years of further protections.
Furthermore, candidates were permitted to impose national treatment
and MFN exceptions to the extent necessary to meet their obligations
under EC law. 1 6 Not surprisingly, this focus on the internal
mechanics of the EC substantive trade and investment policies belies
a deep concern not so much for the integrity of the EC's investment
framework, but instead for EC protectionism. Quotas, along with
other requirements, were permitted to dictate content sourcing from
11 7
other EU member states.
112. For an examination of the European Commission's explanation of the row after the fact,
see Press Release, EU Comm'n, Eight Acceding Countries and U.S. Sign Bilateral Investment
23,
2003),
available at
http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/
Understanding
(Sept.
2003/2003059.htm.
113. Business interests throughout the United States objected to the EU's position, with the
United States Council for International Business spearheading protests from the U.S. business
community. See, e.g., Model BIT Letter to Host (Latvia), U.S. Council for Int'l Bus. (Aug. 1,
(protesting the
2002),
available at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentlD=2228
"discriminatory set of rules" U.S. businesses would face vis-A-vis their European competitors and
other firms from countries with BITs still in place).
114. Press Release, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Under Sec'y for Pub. Diplomacy and Pub.
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Bilateral Investment Treaties with European Union Accession States
(Sept. 5, 2003), availableat http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/23841.htm.
115. See, e.g., Additional Protocol Concerning Business and Economic Relations, U.S.-Pol.,
arts. I, IV, Jan. 12, 2004, S. TREATY Doc. No.108-22 (2004) (regarding the Republic of Poland).
116. See, e.g., id. art. IV (regarding the Republic of Poland).
117. See, e.g., id., art. I (regarding the Republic of Poland).
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Ultimately, the EC's intervention increases the prospect of
future challenges to other candidates' BITs as the EC moves towards
further enlargement. Despite the failure of the EC Constitution, the
EC opened further accession discussions with Turkey in 2004118 and
Croatia a year later. 119 Furthermore, EC policymakers are actively
contemplating the eventual entry of additional Balkan states, such as
Albania, to the EC. 120 Each of these candidates are parties to BITs
that present potential structural inconsistencies of the same nature as
those identified between EC regional accords and the BITs of first
round accession candidates. 121 As a result, if the EC adopts the same
reasoning as it did in the first round of enlargement, these BITs will
have to be modified or terminated.
B. U.S. Trade Treaties in South America
1. Turmoil in the Andean Community
The EC is not the only RIA to encounter structural
inconsistency. Even more tumultuous and recent have been the
experiences of the Andean Community (the Comunidad Andina de

118. Press Release, Eur. Union, Delegation of the Eur. Comm'n to the U.S., EU Commission
President Romano Prodi on Decision to Open Membership Talks with Turkey (Oct. 6, 2004),
availableat http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/200400135.htm.
119. Press Release, Eur. Union, Delegation of the Eur. Comm'n to the U.S., The European
Union Opens Accession Negotiations With Croatia (Oct. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2005/2005082.htm.
120. See Press Release, Eur. Union, Key Findings on the Progress Reports on Kosovo and the
Potential Candidate Countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia (Nov. 8,
2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search date range 8/11/2006 to
8/11/2006 using keywords "Albania" and "Montegro') (discussing key findings in the accession
process).
121. Turkey's BIT with the United States--one of the first six ever completed by the United
States with another country-offers only one sectoral exception to the MFN and national
treatment obligations also provided for in the GATS (air transport). Treaty Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Turk., protocol, 1, Dec. 3, 1985,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-19. Similarly, Romania's BIT with the United States prohibits
performance requirements and provides no sectoral exceptions overlapping with the EC. Treaty
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rom., art. II, 5,
annex, May 28, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-36. Croatia's and Albania's BITs are similarly
broad and, though providing for some post-establishment protections, proffer few sectoral
exceptions to MFN and national treatment obligations and prohibit virtually all performance
requirements. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Croat., art. VII, annex, July 13, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-29; Treaty Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Alb., art. VI, annex, Jan. 11, 1995,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-19.
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Naciones or "CAN"), South America's second-largest trading bloc.1 2 2 In
April 2006, Venezuela, one of the organization's members, evoked both
the historical policy objectives and procedural rules of the organization
in an attempt to pressure CAN members Peru and Colombia to refrain
from signing BFTAs with the United States. When Peru and Colombia
nevertheless signed the agreements, Venezuela withdrew from the
123
CAN in protest and joined South America's largest RIA, Mercosur.
As a full member of Mercosur, Venezuela now wields effective veto
power over the bilateral agreements that any of its members
124
negotiate, complicating U.S.-backed liberalization efforts.
Unlike
the
EU-BIT
renegotiations, this
geostrategic
reconfiguration has largely political, as opposed to legal,
underpinnings. One of the earliest efforts of economic integration in
the Western hemisphere, the CAN was formally inaugurated on May
26, 1969, when Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru signed the
Cartagena Agreement, a socialist accord establishing a framework for
deepening the economic and political integration of the signatory
countries. 125 Originally envisioned to spur industrialization through
import-substitution mechanisms, the CAN's policy mandate was based
almost entirely on "high tariffs as walls" towards outsiders. 126 This
platform proved popular in the region, particularly in light of the
failures of earlier regional efforts at achieving broad and equitable
development. 2 7 Venezuela joined as a sixth member in 1973.128
122. See Joanna Klonsky, Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12762/ (noting that Mercosur
is South America's largest trading bloc).
123. Humberto Mirquez, Last Rites For Andean Community?, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS

AGENCY, Apr. 19, 2006, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=4497.
124. See Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Symposium: Free Trade Areas: The Challenge and
Promise of Fair vs. Free Trade, 27 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS.1073, 1106 (1996) (noting that "the

adoption of legal norms by such organs is based on consensus and subject to the unilateral veto
of a member country").
125. Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Kotschwar, The United States and the Andean Community:
Prospects and Problems at the End of the Twentieth Century, in THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY AND
THE UNITED STATES: TRADE AND INVESTMENT RELATIONS IN THE 1990S 43, 43 (Mendoza et al.

eds., 1998), available at http://www.dttc.oas.org/TRADE/Pub/Books/CAF/caftoc-e.asp. At the
time, the institution was originally called the "Andean Group." Id.
126. Id.
127. Regionalization had earlier been spearheaded by the Latin American Free Trade
Association ("LAFTA"). Launched in 1960 and consisting of all of South America's Spanishspeaking countries, LAFTA had been viewed by many elites as reproducing on a regional scale
hegemonic relationships characteristic of North-South relations. Gordon Mace, Regional
Integration in Latin America: A Long and Winding Road, 43 INT'L J. 404, 412 (1988). Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico had all increased trade at a faster rate than any other members, though they
were still unwilling to extend special preferences to smaller countries, preventing them from
becoming dynamic participants in LAFTA. William P. Avery and James D. Cochrane, Innovation
in Latin American Regionalism: The Andean Common Market, 27 INT'L ORG. 181, 184 (1973).

1382

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:5:1349

~K.
0 iidendczm State
• dependea terriTtory

* member

I

[] associate member
0 observer

129
The Andean Community ("CAN")

Nevertheless, states took few concrete steps towards economic
integration over the next twenty years, as they embarked upon
independent and, at times, divergent paths of development.130 Instead,
it was only in the wake of economic crisis and a new interest in
economic liberalization that states fully launched regionalization
efforts.1 3 1 Reeling from falling commodity prices and the apparent
failures of national protectionist policies, CAN members, starting in
1985 (with Bolivia) and continuing into the late 1990s (with Peru),
instituted a series of domestic reforms aimed at increasing exports,
reigning in inflation, and reducing debt. 132 These collective paths led
The CAN was a direct response to this experience. Championed by Chile, Colombia, and Perumid-sized countries that had found themselves on the losing end of LAFTA-the CAN envisioned
more even economic development driven by broader sectoral liberalization. Id.
128. Hufbauer & Kotschwar, supra note 125.
129. For a copy of the map, see Wikipedia, Andean Community of Nations,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andean-CommunityofNations (last visited Sept. 30, 2007). The
map's accuracy has been verified through outside sources. See, e.g., Andean Community, Who
Are We?, http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/who.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
130. For example, consider Albania and Croatia. For a look at the EU's accession profile for
Albania, see Eur. Comm'n, Albania-EU-Albania Relations, available at http://ec.europa.
eu/enlargement/albanialeualbania relations-en.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2007). For a look at
the EU's accession profile for Croatia, see Eur. Comm'n, Croatia-EU-Croatia Relations,
available at http://ec.europa.eulenlargementlcroatia/index-en.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2007).
131. See Mace, supra note 127, at 418-25 (describing the disarray of the Andean Group, the
predecessor RIA to the Andean Community, throughout the 1980s).
132. Hufbauer & Kotschwar, supra note 125.
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to increasing policy convergence and consensus regarding the
liberalization of intra-bloc relations. 13 3 In 1991, CAN members agreed
134
to adopt a more friendly investment regime for foreign investors.
Then, in 1994, three CAN member states adopted a common external
tariff ("CET") for third-party countries. This represented the
cornerstone of the Andean foreign commercial policy and the
inauguration of the group as a customs union. 135 Finally, in July 2005,
the CAN signed an agreement with Mercosur, the third-largest trade
bloc in the world behind the EU and NAFTA, in which the two RIAs
granted each other's members reciprocal "associate member status."1 36
Though not committing to political integration, the enhanced
affiliations envision the removal of trade barriers over the next fifteen
years.137

The CAN remains, however, a largely imperfect customs union.
Underlying differences among member states in the level and
composition of trade and the destination of exports, has made
consensus and wider adoption of the CET difficult. Bolivia-the only
landlocked Andean country and subject to rules imposed by Chile
regarding the use of its ports, cargo handling, and other important
matters-maintains its own tariff, though its application remains
subject to CAN administration. 138 Peru, meanwhile, does not
participate in the CET. Because it began its economic liberalization in
1992, later than the other CAN members, it has consistently chosen
steeper liberalization programs to better compete economically with
the other member countries.1 39 These departures have left Colombia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela as the only full participants in the customs
union. Even here, generous policy reservations are afforded member

133. Id. (indicating how all member states undertook privatization and unilateral steps to
decrease barriers to international trade).
134. Andean

Community, Regime for the Common Treatment of Foreign Capital and

Trademarks, Patents, Licensing Agreements and Royalties, Andean Group Decision No. 291,
(Mar. 21, 1991), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/normativa/d291e.htm;
see also Hufbauer & Kotschwar, supra note 125, at 56.
135. Andean Community, Chronological Sequence of Events, http://www.comunidadandina.
org/ingles/quienes/events.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2007).
136. Radl Pierri, Region's Two Major Blocs Sign Free Trade Deal, INTER PRESS SERVICE
NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 19, 2001, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=860.

137. Id.
138. Jorge Crespo-Velasco & Gonzalo D. Bernal-Brito, U.S.-Bolivia Trade and Investment
Relations, in THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES, supra note 125, at 70-71.

139. See Andean Community, Trade Integration, Free Trade Area, http://www.com
unidadandina.org/INGLES/comercio/customsunion.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2007) ("Peru in
August 1997 started taking steps toward its incorporation in the Andean FTA, in keeping with a
Liberalization and tariff reduction program. Those steps came to an end on December 31, 2005,
making the free trade area among the five CAN Member Countries a reality.").
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states. Pursuant to Andean Community Decision 598, each member
state is empowered to negotiate independently trade agreements with
40
third-party countries or regional or multilateral organizations.'
Thus, despite its tariff harmonization initiatives, the CAN remains a
quintessentially "open" RIA.
This is not to say that members fail to recognize the
advantages of collective action. Indeed, the CAN has traditionally
sought to act as much as possible as a bloc. Decision 598, which
permits bilateralism, nonetheless
deems such engagements
"exceptional" courses of action to be undertaken only when regional
agreement is not possible. 141 Furthermore, when securing agreements
with third-party states, members should "take into account the
commercial sensitivities of the other Andean countries . "...
142 Where
states do opt for bilateral programs, the CAN obligates members to
notify the CAN Commission to enhance policy coordination with other
43
members.1
Not surprisingly, the purpose behind these measures is to
leverage the collective bargaining power of the group. As in Europe,
CAN officials have long held that where members work together, they
can enjoy more bargaining power with the rest of the worldparticularly against countries with large economies, such as the
United States.' 44 Thus, cooperation and coordination are encouraged
institutionally.
Ironically, however, it was precisely the size and power of the
U.S. economy that in April 2006 spurred dissension as to the
desirability of collective action and closer economic relations with
Washington. Peru and Colombia, fervent backers of free trade policies
since the 1990s, pushed for the completion of agreements with the
United States that would liberalize the treatment of goods and
investment from their countries. 145 The leaders of both countries
140. Andean Community, Trade Relations With Third Countries,Andean Group Decision No.
598
(July
12,
2004),
available
at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/
normativa/D598e.htm.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.

144. On their own, Andean countries have possessed little leverage in negotiating favorable
terms for economic agreements because the U.S. economy has dwarfed that of any individual
state. Together, however, the CAN represents one-third of South America's market, as well as an
important source of two "strategic" commodities for the United States-petroleum and
narcotics-which gives the region an enhanced importance and bargaining position. Hufbauer &
Kotschwar, supranote 125, at 45.
145. See CARLOS MALAMUD, ELCANO ROYAL INST., VENEZUELA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
ANDEAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION (PART I)

3

(2006),

http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/983/983_MalamudVenezuela-CAN_
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hoped for deeper integration with, and penetration into, U.S. markets.
However, radical changes in the Venezuelan and Bolivian
governments, particularly the elections of leftist Presidents Hugo
Chavez and Evo Morales, respectively, inaugurated deeply antiAmerican policies and national outlooks. 146 Dissatisfied with what
they claimed to be the unsatisfactory performance of their economies
since adopting neoliberal reforms, both leaders found the treaties
repugnant to Mercosur's initial aspirations-the economic and social
integration of South America. 147 For them, free trade would permit the
United States to flood Andean markets with its goods and attain even
greater political sway in the region.
Faced with unlikely prospects for regional consensus, Peru and
Colombia exercised their rights under Decision 598 and negotiated
BFTAs with the United States on their own in February 2006.148 Their
independent streak infuriated Bolivia and Venezuela, both of which
complained that they had not been consulted. 149 The two also objected
to the substance of the agreements, arguing that they worked contrary
to backbone principles of solidarity. 5 0° Venezuela's officials noted in
the press that Colombia granted the United States quotas in products
like rice, which Venezuela had provided historically, and that the
BFTAs would facilitate the entry of strongly subsidized U.S. products
into Venezuela through its neighbors.1 51 Furthermore, Venezuela
asserted that the agreements gave advantages to the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry that likely would drive up the prices of
medicines and generate unemployment.15 2 Bolivia similarly criticized
the agreements, insofar as they would reduce the market for Bolivian

partl.pdf [hereinafter MALAMUD, PART I] (describing the intention of the treaties to "open new
markets" and the fact that Mercosur's markets are much larger than Argentina's).
146. See Richard Lapper & Hal Weitzman, Chdvez Casts A Long Anti-American Shadow
Over Regional Capitals:BolivarianAxis, FIN. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at 10 (discussing growing anti-

American sentiment encouraged by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez).
147. Morales and Chavez branded such attempts as betraying South American integration
(Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo was described as a "traitor" for signing the agreements),
and asserted that the attempts signaled the death of the Andean enterprise. MALAMUD, PART I,
supra note 145, at 2.

148. See Carlos Malamud, Venezuela's Withdrawal from the Andean Community of Nations
and the Consequences for Regional Integration,REAL INSTITUO ELCANO, May 30, 2006, available

at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/983.asp (discussing Venezuela's withdrawal from
CAN "after the signing of the FTAs between Colombia and Peru and the United States").
149. Mdrquez, supra note 123.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (discussing the complaint of the Venezuelan trade minister that the Peruvian and
Columbian treaties "granted the United States quotas in products that Venezuela sold" such
nations, for example, pharmaceuticals).
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soybeans, essentially ruining the economic prospects of its domestic
153
farmers.
Responding to the treaties, President Chavez, at the time
holding the bloc's rotating presidency, announced that his country
would withdraw from the CAN. In dramatic fashion, he argued that
Colombia's and Peru's embrace of neoliberalism effectively rendered
the organization "dead." 154 Venezuela consequently would place its
confidence in South America's largest trade bloc, Mercosur, which
expedited the country's membership. 155 Bolivia, too, was rankled by
the BFTAs, though it refrained from withdrawing altogether. As the
country's Vice President admitted, Bolivia, of all the countries in the
CAN, is the most dependent on its neighbors-much more so than oilrich Venezuela. 15 6 Because Bolivia's exports to the larger countries in
the bloc account for a significant portion of its overall exports-nearly
seventeen percent 157-the country could ill-afford to defect from the
58
RIA.
Though Venezuela eventually entered into a rapprochement
with the remaining CAN members, the Andean Community's political
debacle illustrates in profound fashion how structural inconsistency
may arise even where constituent states are granted considerable
leeway to pursue independent foreign and economic affairs. 15 9 Open
regional frameworks empower members to embrace their own policies
with outsiders, but regional cooperation may remain a powerful
organizational norm or expectation that constrains the options of
members.

153. Id. Perhaps ironically, however, it has been the United States that has objected most to
the treaties, in part due to the absence of language calling on signatories to adhere to
international labor and environmental standards. See Jennifer Loven, Bush: Protectionism Will
Cost U.S. Jobs, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Oct. 13, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/10/13/AR2007101300569.html (noting George Bush's efforts at restoring the
stalled treaties in Congress).
154. Id.

155. Id.
156. MALAMUD, PART I, supra note 145, at 6.

157. This translates into $466 million annually. Id.
158. Nevertheless, as a show of support, Bolivia joined other initiatives fomented by ChAvez,
like the Alternativa Bolivariana de las Americas and the Peoples' Trade Treaty (Tratado de
Comercio de los Pueblos, or TCP). Id.
159. Venezuela has, for example, agreed to form a Working Group with Mercosur's
remaining members to propose regulations for trade between the parties. See MALAMUD, PART I,
supra note 145, at 2 (discussing Venezuela's potential reasons for choosing Mercosur over CAN).
If successful, few substantive changes will be made in the economic relationship between
Venezuela and CAN members, though the status of their alliance will be frozen at the level of
liberalization that existed as of April 22, 2006-the day on which Venezuela denunciated the
treaty.
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60

Mercosur1

2. Mercosur's Uncertain Future
Venezuela's decision to leave the CAN for Mercosur was, as
some journalists have suggested, far from naive. 61 Founded in 1991
by the Treaty of Asunci6n, the customs union between Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay moves over $150 billion in annual
trade, compared to the CAN's $9 billion.16 2 Even though, as mentioned
above, CAN members enjoy "associate member" status in Mercosur
is much
with certain trade benefits, full membership in Mercosur
63
more valuable to Venezuela than membership in the CAN.

160. For a copy of the map, see Wikimedia, Image: Map of MERCOSUR,
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Map-ofMERCOSUR.png (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
The map's accuracy has been verified through outside sources. See, e.g., Portal Oficial
MERCOSUR, http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2007); Profile: MercosurCommon Market of the South, BBC News, May 24, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
americas/5195834.stm.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Venezuela's accession nevertheless poses serious challenges for
Mercosur. Venezuela's full membership confers on it a more active role
in Mercosur than it had as an associate. This fact has not pleased
Argentina and Brazil, Mercosur's two largest members. 164 Both are
skeptical of Venezuela's attempts to align with Paraguay and
Uruguay, the organization's smallest members and countries they
have long dominated economically and politically. 165 Indeed,
Venezuela announced its withdrawal during a summit with Bolivia,
Paraguay, and Uruguay-a conference
of "Mercosur" that
conspicuously omitted the two regional powerhouses. 166 Moreover, the
announcement served as a platform from which Paraguay and
Uruguay, bolstered by Venezuela's cry against economic imperialism,
decried how they, too, had been "mistreated" independently by
Argentina and Brazil. 167 Echoing long held criticisms of "subimperialism," the two argued that Argentina and Brazil long had
orchestrated programs that disproportionately benefited their larger
domestic markets. Thus, in their view, radical changes in regional
policy were needed. 168 Nonetheless, Uruguay and Paraguay differed
dramatically from Venezuela in terms of their proposed policy
solution: as opposed to greater integration among members, the two
countries called for closer bilateral cooperation, particularly with the
United States in the form of BFTAs, to dilute Brazil's and Argentina's
1 69
regional influence.
These divergent member-state objectives and interests have
increased the prospects of significant structural inconsistency for
Mercosur. Like the EU, Mercosur is, at least formally, a closed
regional system. Under Mercosur Resolution 32, member states
individually cannot negotiate trade or economic agreements with
other countries, effectively granting veto rights to members.1 70 This
poses significant challenges for both Paraguay and Uruguay if they
decide to pursue free trade initiatives. As noted above, Brazil and
Argentina have sought to deter any third-party relationships with the
164. CARLOS MALAMUD, ELCANO ROYAL INST., VENEZUELA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CAN
(ANDEAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS) AND ITS EFFECTS ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION (PART I): THE
IMPACT
ON
MERCOSUR
(ARI)
1-2
(2006),
http://www.realinstituoelcano.org/

analisis/996/996_Malamud&VenezuelaCAN-partlI.pdf [hereinafter MALAMUD, PART II].
165. Id.

166. See id. at 2 ('The impact of the meeting was such that a senior government official from
Argentina asked: 'How can there be a meeting of Mercosur which excludes Brazil and
Argentina?' ").

167. Id.
168. Id.

169. Mdrquez, supra note 123.
170. MALAMUD, PART II, supra note 164, at 2.
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region's smaller countries, which they have dominated historically.
They even have announced in advance that BFTAs with the United
States would be vetoed. 17 1 Venezuela also clearly finds U.S.-backed
BFTAs repugnant to its own strategic interests. 172 As a result, if
Paraguay or Uruguay ever wished to enter into BFTA negotiations,
the likelihood of veto would force the country to downgrade its status
in Mercosur from a full member to an associate member.
Importantly, Paraguay and Uruguay are not the only countries
whose bilateral initiatives could face challenges. Indeed, the recent
hard-line approaches taken by some Mercosur members also bode ill
for a variety of trade agreements already entered into by the RIA's
associate members, Chile, Columbia, and Peru (all CAN members).
Each has BFTAs in place with a variety of third-party countries. 73
Such initiatives could prove repugnant to regional hegemons, Brazil
and Argentina. Furthermore, Venezuela has threatened to tear down
the current Mercosur and create a "new" Mercosur more responsive to
its own socialist dictates. 74 In addition, as a full member, Venezuela
could request that the three countries denounce their BFTAs, petition
that the three withdraw altogether from Mercosur or, as at least one
commentator has speculated, withdraw itself from Mercosur,
75
potentially casting the RIA into political turmoil.
The reciprocal nature of regional integration also poses
structural inconsistency challenges for Venezuela, particularly as the
country's leadership charts new programs aimed at integrating leftleaning countries in the region. In April 2005, Chavez and Cuban
President Fidel Castro proposed the Alternativa Bolivariana de las
171. Id.

172. See generally MALAMUD, PART I, supra note 145 (describing Venezuela's skepticism of
bilateral agreements with the United States).
173. Besides Colombia and Peru, whose BFTAs with the United States sparked Venezuela's
ultimate termination of its membership in the CAN, Chile, a third associate member, has signed
fifteen BFTAs, including agreements with the United States, the EU, China, Japan, and Korea.
Chile is currently in the process of negotiating other BFTAs with a variety of countries, including
India. See Organization of American States, Chile-India, http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CHL
_IND/CHLINDe.asp#new (last visited Aug. 24, 2007) (regarding developments in negotiations
with India).
174. MALAMUD, PART II, supra note 164, at 2. When announcing Venezuela's intention to join
Mercosur, Chavez proclaimed that "if Mercosur has to die for true integration to be born, then so
be it." Id. He also warned Mercosur's member states that if the organization "did not undertake a
profound restructuring, laying greater emphasis on social issues, it might endure the same fate
as the CAN." Id. Part of this restructuring lay, accordingly, in "decontaminating" the bloc of
U.S.-supported policies. Michael Astor, Mercosur Leaders Grapple Over Direction, BOSTON
GLOBE,

Jan.

19,

2007,

http://www.boston.combusiness/articles/2007/01/19/south_

americanleadersfocus-on-poor.
175. See MALAMUD, PART II, supra note 164, at 6 (discussing Chavez's trade policies as "part
of his attempts to change.., the geopolitical map of Latin America").
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Americas ("ALBA"), a trade pact based on socialist ideals, as an
alternative to the US-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas. 176 As a
first step towards its creation, the two joined Bolivia's President
Morales in signing the Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos ("TCP"), a
free trade treaty that provides oil in exchange for produce and other
agricultural products. 177 At the time they became effective, the
agreements were relatively easy to consummate because Venezuela
was not a signatory of Mercosur. Forging onwards with the grander
ALBA will, however, be more difficult with Venezuela as a full
member of Mercosur. Inconsistencies could arise between the
integration objectives of Venezuela and the foreign policy interests of
more moderate countries like Brazil and Argentina-not to mention
the center-right governments of Uruguay and Paraguay. Trade
programs, however, will require the acquiescence of all Mercosur
member states. In the wake of severe disagreement, Mercosur could
split, like the Andean Community-or even, as some analysts have
178
warned, collapse.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
Structural inconsistency holds important implications for
debates introduced in Part I concerning integration and economic
discipline. This Part argues that regional integration has
repercussions for global efficiency beyond even the erosion of WTO
institutions and values. Insofar as they subvert bilateral regimes
promoting free trade, RIAs impose negative net welfare effects on the
global economy. And even where RIA members as a group may enjoy
positive welfare benefits from regional protectionism, it is likely that
gains will not be distributed evenly among members, highlighting
significant "fairness" tradeoffs concomitant to some forms of regional,
legal, and economic integration.

176. For a description of ALBA in English, see generally Alternativa Bolivariana de las
Americas, http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/pdf/alba-mice-en.pdf (last visited Aug. 24,
2007).
177. Under ALBA, Venezuela would additionally help Bolivia and other participants finance
up to fifty percent of their oil bill and would create a matching fund to finance agricultural
projects, food production and small-to-medium size industries. Natalie Obiko Pearson, Chavez
Aims to Meet Left's Energy Needs, INT'L Bus. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, http://www.ibtimes.com/
apnews/20070428/venezuela-oil-diplomacy.htm.
178. See MALAMUD, PART I, supra note 145, at 1 ("[Plositions are starting to polarise and it is
regional integration itself that is under the knife.").
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A. Consequences for Global Efficiency
The notion of incompatible regional and bilateral legal
instruments requires a refinement and reconsideration of prevailing
policy debates concerning the optimality of regional integration. As
mentioned above, most criticism of RIAs has centered on the extent to
which regional clubs undermine the multilateral trading system.
Many commentators are concerned that regionalism creates
alternative institutions to the WTO that not only lower duties and
taxes for members, but also raise or preserve tariff walls for the rest of
the world. 179 When only members in a regional organization can
benefit from free trade, RIAs potentially substitute more efficient
imports from outside the group with lower-tariff, though less efficient,
intra-bloc imports.
Structural inconsistency adds to these concerns by suggesting
that RIAs also may undermine important bilateral initiatives that
promote liberalization and free trade. Closed RIAs may cordon off or
subvert a member state's bilateral initiatives that do not meet the
legal requirements of the RIA or that are subject to vetoes by other
states seeking to protect their own domestic industries. Similarly, the
dynamics of even open RIAs may make some bilateral agreements
politically untenable for the proponents of such programs.
RIAs consequently pose challenges to efficiency in bilateral
relationships that are potentially as far-reaching as regionalism's
possible implications for the WTO. As with the global trading system,
the termination or undermining of BFTAs could divert trade from
efficient outsider producers to inefficient regional companies. And
because investment treaties grant investors more credible protections,
the denunciation or weakening of BITs makes foreign investment
more vulnerable to potentially unproductive and illegitimate hoststate interference. In both cases, resources will be wasted and
prevented from being put to their best or most productive use.
B. Regional (Group) Welfare Considerations
1. The Trade Context
The impact of these inefficiencies on the welfare of RIA
member states as a group will be context dependent. In the trade
arena, termination of a BFTA entails a switch from low-cost to high-

179. See supra text accompanying notes 26-33.
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cost sources. Faced with a decision between a more expensive import
from an outsider (due to high duties) and a lower-priced, albeit
inefficiently produced, intra-bloc import, a consumer will choose the
intra-bloc import, all things being equal.s 0 This inefficiency is
internalized by the group, however, because the importing member
state loses real resources. Where a member's consumers used to pay x
for widgets from an outsider, they now pay for intra-bloc imports x
plus y, the difference between the third party's price and the intra-bloc
1 81
price.
Importantly, standard trade economics suggests that this loss
18 2
will not necessarily be offset by a fellow RIA member's gain.
Whether or not an RIA experiences a loss will instead be determined
by the size of wasted consumer surplus as compared with an RIA's
gains. To envision what this means in concrete terms, imagine a trade
relationship wherein consumers in Italy can buy cars made in either
Germany or Japan. The cost of producing a car in Germany is $10,000,
whereas the cost of producing the functional equivalent in Japan is
$8,000. However, if tariffs on each Japanese car amount to $4,000,
then consumers in Italy will choose the German car for $10,000 over
the more efficiently produced Japanese model, which now costs
$12,000. Under such circumstances, for each car sold there is a $2,000
excess over the price that a consumer normally would be willing to pay
(referred to in economic terms as "wasted consumer surplus"). In those
circumstances where a consumer nevertheless opts for a Japanese car,
there is a wasted consumer surplus of $4,000 for each car sold.
Generally, two sources of RIA revenue will offset these losses.
The first source is tariffs on outsider imports. For example, when a
consumer opts for the Japanese car, the $4,000 in wasted consumer
surplus will be offset by the $4,000 in tariffs collected by the Italian
government. Purchase of a German car would, however, have different
implications. Within the EU, countries do not impose tariffs on one
another's goods, so intra-bloc sales will not be taxed. Instead, the
primary source for offsetting losses will be the income gained from
selling exports above costs (e.g. profit).18 3 Thus, in the example above,
180. For this reason, RIAs can be said to create a "club good," namely a preferential market.
See generally Chris Brummer, Regional Integration and Incomplete Club Goods: A Trade
Perspective, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming winter 2008) (showing how RIAs exhibit some, though
not all, characteristics of economic clubs).
181. SCHIFF & WINTERS, supra note 9, at 34.
182. Id.

183. For purposes of simplicity, I am assuming surplus production capacity in Germany. If
there was, on the other hand, full employment, one sector would theoretically have to contract
for Germany's factories to produce more cars (to meet increased demand from trade diversion).
This contraction would have to be factored into the losses incurred by the RIA. I am also
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a German car would have to be sold for more than $2,000 profit (or
$12,000) for the trade diversion to provide a net benefit to the group.
This will be difficult since the market will constrain price increases. In
this case, the price per unit will not be able to exceed the price of
imports from its closest competitors. Where Japanese cars cost
$12,000, German cars will have to be sold for more than $2,000 above
production costs. Therefore, the RIA's "profit" margin likely will be
thin. As a result, even where tariffs are significant, the benefits of
trade diversion may prove illusory.
2. The Investment Context
Like trade agreements, investment treaties contribute to
efficiency by removing inefficient barriers to foreign business activity.
However, the welfare calculation when investment treaties are
terminated differs from trade, insofar as the benefits granted third
parties under a BIT are internalized by host states as costs.
Investment treaties lower the risk and cost of capital for foreign
investors, making the host state a more attractive destination for
capital. But they do so by prohibiting certain forms of host-state
interference, like a country's ability to change the terms of investment
and exploit foreign enterprises. Such restrictions on rent seeking
impose costs on the host state, which can be significant. As Andrew
Guzman has explained in his seminal work on BITs, investment
treaties "make the market for foreign investment much more
competitive by allowing competition in the 'price' of investment, that
is, the terms under which investment takes place."18 4 In other words,
many states enter into BITs to pull investment from other similarly
situated countries.18 5 Yet, as states engage in successive iterations of
one-upmanship, they bid down the price of investment and reduce the
degree to which host states may take value from foreign investment.
In the process, a country's margins on gains from foreign investment
effectively are squeezed.

bracketing, for the moment, demand curve analysis. Presumably, if tariffs were removed on
Japanese automobiles, more Italian consumers would be able to afford cars. Depending on the
relationship between the price of the good and the amount or quantity the consumer is willing
and able to purchase (the "demand curve"), more Japanese cars would be sold, comprising
additional possible losses to the RIA.
184. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularityof BilateralInvestment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 682-83 (1998).

185. Because neighboring states are often competitors for foreign investment, economic
theory suggests this will be a significant issue in RIAs.
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As a result, collective decisions by RIA members not to sign
BITs or to denounce existing ones will not necessarily erode their
collective resources. Theoretically, such organization could solve
coordination problems for members and allow the group to extract
more value from foreign investments. Though inefficient from a global
standpoint,18 6 collective action would at least set the group on the path
to achieving monopoly power over investment terms. Coordination
would render the market for foreign investment and RIA resources
imperfectly competitive. Consequently, investment would remain
subject to the goodwill of the host state, and RIA governments could
capture a larger share of the rents without losing the investment
beyond drops in aggregate levels of investment due to rising costs of
18 7
capital.
Monopoly gains are only possible, however, if the investment
into any particular RIA is insensitive to the terms on which that
investment is made across individual member states. In other words,
it must be more likely that investors will switch from one member
state to another, rather than switching to an outsider, in response to a
change in costs. Otherwise, investment will be repatriated to other
regions, causing a net loss to the RIA both in terms of lost investment
and collateral benefits such as technology transfers and employment.
Thus, the welfare effects of structural inconsistency in the trade
context are an empirical question that depends, at least in part, on the
RIA at issue and the purpose of the investment venture. Most
investment is mobile, particularly where foreign investors seek lowcost, low-skilled labor. Effective locales supporting these kinds of
inputs are widespread; therefore, rises in input costs could result in
repatriation outside an RIA. Some investment, however, may be more
asset-specific, particularly where investors seek access to markets and
economies, special inputs such as natural resources, or a highly
educated workforce. In such cases, RIAs may realize market power
more effectively.
These observations suggest that structural inconsistency holds
highly differentiated and, at times, case-dependent outcomes for group

186. See Guzman, supra note 184, at 683-84 ("[A] regime that allows for more contracting
between host governments and investors is more efficient than a regime in which potential hosts
cannot effectively commit to any particular behavior or agreement.").
187. Id. at 681-82. To be sure, a firm could choose to repatriate its capital outside the RIA in
the face of adverse governmental conduct, and a country could be subject to reputational costs
slowing future investment. Nevertheless, repatriation would entail its own transaction costs, and
though reputational damages could be significant, the very existence of BITs suggests that, in
the words of Guzman, "there is no reason to think that reputational concerns are enough to cause
[countries] to honor commitments." Id. at 682.
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welfare. In the trade context, the termination of efficient BFTAs most
likely only will provide gains where tariffs are significantly higher
than the marginal difference between RIA and outsider goods.
Similarly, the termination of BITs will provide net benefits to the
group only where RIA members achieve monopoly power through
collusion. These insights do not position RIAs definitively as inferior
modes of international cooperation vis-A-vis multilateral or bilateral
integration when these conditions are not met, though they do
highlight important possible tradeoffs concomitant to regional
integration.
C. The Distributive Welfare Problem
1. Theorizing Likely Winners and Losers
Although regional integration may make certain monopoly
gains possible through collective bargaining, these benefits may be
distributed unevenly between members in a regional club. Instead,
structural inconsistency suggests that the allocation of benefits may
be determined by factors unrelated to the pro rata economic
contributions of members. This observation pushes the available
literature on RIAs by indicating important "fairness" tradeoffs
embedded in regional economic and legal integration.
As noted above, the logic of regional integration is derived
largely from the advantages of collective action. For example,
European unification, the first modern effort at regional integration,
was largely a response to what national elites viewed as their waning
clout in the wake of American and Asian economic resurgence. To
counter the trend, promoters of deeper integration have argued for "a
share of more effective power" through cooperation with member
states, rather than "exclusive control over a less effective or wholly
ineffective power."'188 By increasingly speaking with one voice-a
process enabled by the supremacy of EC law-promoters envisioned
engaging the United States and new rising powers like China "on
equal terms."'1 9 Similarly, the ultimate objectives of the CAN

188. Alberta Sbragia, Politics in the European Union, in EUROPEAN POLITICS TODAY 457, 459
(Gabriel A. Almond et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006) (quoting Jack Hayward, The Populist Challenge to
Elitist Democracy in Europe, in

ELITISM, POPULISM, AND EUROPEAN POLITICS 10, 29 (Jack

Hayward ed., 1996)).
189. See Allan Rosas, The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and
Challenges 59 (Sept. 16-19, 1998) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Forum for U.S.-E.U.
Economic Affairs, Helsinki, on file with author). As Charles A. Kupchan notes:
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historically have included not only the liberalization of markets, but
also the realization of an Andean strategy of social cohesion and a
strengthening of common foreign policy to ensure a larger role in the
world economy. 190 Indeed, from the ASEAN to the Economic
Community of West African States, RIAs, particularly those
comprised of developing countries, increasingly are viewed not only as
instruments of economic liberalization, but also as vehicles for
empowering the common interests of constituent members. 191
Practically, however, RIAs do not consist of homogenous
constituent member states and interests. As the CAN's tortured
development indicates, even where members are geographic neighbors
or culturally similar, they may exhibit (at times widely) varying
priorities and agendas, especially in economic matters. One state may,
for example, have competitive strengths in certain sectors like textile
manufacturing and may wish to encourage liberal exports with large
third-party markets. A less advanced regional partner, however, may
seek to protect its domestic industries with high tariffs until it can
compete globally. Consequently, even though RIAs may be envisioned
to promote common group interests towards outsiders, the actual
constellation of interests among members may be extremely divergent.
Inconsistencies are likely to be most acute where RIAs are
comprised of states of disparate sizes and market power. Under such
circumstances, economic theory suggests that some members-by
virtue of their size-likely will benefit from integration more than
others. Large countries tend to be more developed and, as such,
produce more exports. However in the absence of a trade agreement
declaring otherwise, these goods usually are taxed by importers, and
exporters must compete on equal terms with others (presuming their
competition has not entered into an agreement with the importing

The French used to be alone in looking to the EC as a counterpoise to America, but
the other members have now joined in. Tony Blair has asserted, "Whatever its origin,
Europe today is no longer just about peace. It is about projecting collective power."
Germany's Chancellor Gerhard Schroder called for a "more integrated and enlarged
Europe" to offset U.S. hegemony. According to Romano Prodi, the [former] President
of the European Commission, the EC's executive body, one of the chief goals of the
union is to create "a superpower on the European continent that stands equal to the
United States." Goran Persson, the Prime Minister of Sweden, a country that long ago
renounced power politics, recently remarked that the EU is "one of the few
institutions we can develop as a balance to U.S. world domination."
Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the West, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2002, at 42.
190. Andean Community, Who Are We?, http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/who.htm
(last visited Aug. 24, 2007).
191. See SCHIFF & WINTERS, supra note 9, at 19-21 (arguing that such pooling may enhance
the effectiveness of medium and small-size states, though cooperation of this kind does not
necessarily require trade preferences).
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state). On the other hand, with integration, exports from large
regional states are sold free of tariffs. This dynamic often constitutes
one-sided gains: larger countries enjoy a competitive edge over
potentially more efficient outsiders, while smaller countries lose tariff
revenues. Smaller countries may benefit from increased access to the
commodities and raw materials markets of large countries, but
generally they will have a higher import demand and thus benefit less
than their larger neighbors. Large states, in short, enjoy the largest
trade surpluses.
Size creates additional discrepancies in the actual distribution
of gains. In theory, a compensatory mechanism could allocate
efficiency gains more equitably; however, small countries often are
poorly positioned to negotiate better terms for trade and investment.
Though RIAs create a medium for states to pool their collective
market power through their interactions with outsiders, they do little
to cure power imbalances between members of the group. 192 Large
countries usually recognize the economic and political usefulness of
retaining productive relationships with smaller countries. 193 Small
states, however, due to their market size, conceivably will stand to
lose more than large states from failed cooperation, as suggested by
Bolivia's decision to remain in the CAN. Not only will they continue to
suffer from weaker leverage in their negotiations with outsiders, but
they also may lose the economic benefits of access to larger countries'
special markets, or even the goodwill of neighbors.' 94 As a result, large
states, or coalitions of larger states, frequently are positioned to craft
regional policies that create disproportionate gains for themselves, as
seen in such programs like the CAP and the EC's air and transport
exception.

192. See Olson & Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory of Alliances, 48 REV. ECON. & STAT. 266,
267 (1966) ("In the sharing of the costs of efforts to achieve a common goal in small groups, there
is... a surprising tendency for the 'exploitation' of the great by the small.").
193. Indeed, according to at least one commentator, even industrialized countries continue
the drive for regional integration in hopes of liberalizing services to counter what some regard as
"unfair competition due to, for example, piracy or poor labor standards. They also desire to open
up markets for their services sectors, where they have a comparative advantage." Agustin
Carstens, Deputy Managing Dir., Int'l Monetary Fund, Making Regional Economic Integration
Work, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Pakistan Society of Development Economists (Jan.
12, 2005), availableat http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/011205.htm.
194. Many small countries enter into RIAs with hopes of attaining an advantage over other
similar countries in attracting FDI. "Raising the level of FDI--or domestic investment, for that
matter-requires making a country attractive vis-A-vis other countries. Increasing market size
helps in this regard. Ensuring market access to a major market by entering a [preferential
trading agreement] may be one way of achieving this." Id. Only where the size of an RIA grows
may a large country, due to the economies of scale produced by regional integration, stand to lose
from failed cooperation-though even here it is still less than a small state stands to lose.
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Importantly, small states are not the only relative "losers" in
regional organization. Similarly skewed distributive gains (and losses)
are identifiable between early and late members of RIAs, such that
early members likely reap disproportionate benefits from regional
integration. RIAs are ultimately like any other network insofar as
groups of individual countries enter into cooperative agreements in
which they adopt common standards (like MFN) in various sectors
(like trade). And, like any network, economies of scale heighten
positive feedback dynamics that reinforce the desirability of the
network and the standards embraced by it.195 For example, where a
cell phone provider offers users of its service free "anytime" calls to
others who use the same provider, as the number of people who use
the service increases, the attractiveness of the service increases for
those outside the system. Similarly, RIAs possess similar "external"
attractiveness. When organizations grow in membership, the markets
they represent become more attractive from the standpoint of
economies of scale and institutional maturity and coherence. As a
network acquires a critical mass of participants, benefits external to
the network, such as the ability to cooperate with others who use it,
196
become more important.
The dynamic quality of network power suggests that once RIAs
are established, they exhibit a staying power of their own as
coordinating mechanisms. 197 Change, in short, becomes very difficult
as incoming states generally will be positioned poorly to negotiate new
policies. 198 And once a state attains membership, the prospect of
initiating reforms frequently remains dim, particularly in light of
popular organizational rules that require unanimity or a
supermajority for the approval of new initiatives. This makes possible
"hold-up" opportunities for winners under the existing dispensation of
surplus. As a result, early decisions have lasting repercussions;
network power, bolstered by organizational inertia, effectively freezes
payoff schemes from earlier bargaining iterations. 199

195. David Singh Grewal, Network Power and Global Standardization:The Controversy Over
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, in GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
ACHIEVING GLOBAL JUSTICE 124, 128 (Christian Barry & Thomas W. Pogge eds., 2005) ("[T]he
more people who use a given standard, the more attractive it will be for others to use that same
standard because of the positive feedback dynamic, the possibility of cooperating with greater
numbers of people via the same convention.").
196. Id.
197. Id. at 131-32.
198. This will especially be the case where, as in the EC, candidate states are small or
geographically isolated, thereby leaving few viable partners for regional integration.
199. Grewal, supra note 195, at 131-32.
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These significant policy and power relationships complicate the
premises underlying conventional arguments either promoting or
implicitly extolling the values of collective action. First, they suggest
that RIAs, like most cartels, may be highly inefficient. Far from
promoting competition, internal dynamics may impede the adoption of
the most efficient or competitive policies even from a group
perspective. Second, they illustrate how the rents extracted by an RIA
may not be distributed evenly to group members. Coordination
variables-power asymmetries, network power, rent-seeking, and
strategic action-may also skew distributions of gains accrued by
collective action. Some states may be bigger winners than those who
lose out on what could be viewed as their equitable share of benefits.
Together, these two insights suggest that "collective action" carries an
array of possible configurations, and any notion that it will always
secure more gains for individuals than bilateralism is an
oversimplification of both the descriptive theory and available data.
For all of their potential welfare benefits, RIAs may impose on their
members a variety of costs that offset gains from collective action,
adding another logic-beyond the prisoner's dilemma-as to why
states might defect from regional commitments.
Indeed, the inference from the preceding section is that, at
times, bilateral initiatives by members may provide maximum
benefits for the group. Obviously, this could occur when a state enters
into a special trade or investment pact with a large state, like China
or the United States, whose markets may dwarf those of entire
regions. However, there are other less obvious, though equally
noteworthy, possibilities. Drawing from the CAN's experience,
suppose that regional-member State A is empowered through
organizational rules to hold out on, or block, regional-member State
B's BFTAs with State C, an outsider to the RIA, because State A's
exports in a particular sector to State C may suffer due to competition
with State B. Now suppose that if the BFTAs are adopted, the
marginal difference in price per unit good will permit State B to sell
enough goods to State C to accrue benefits that exceed the cost to
State A in lost exports. In this case, the availability of independent,
bilateral engagement by State B not only will allow State B to avoid
State A's hold up, but also will enable it to enter into an agreement
that maximizes the group's aggregate welfare.
Similarly, the mere availability of bilateral alternatives could
level the power imbalances within regional organizations presented by
asymmetric leverage and market power. In practice, bilateralism
expands the competitive market of potential collaborators for member
states. For example, borrowing from the EC accession episode, if State
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A wishes to impose unproductive (protectionist) policies in the
formulation of a common policy in a sector like agriculture, which
disadvantage smaller members, State B and State C, then the two
could opt out of the regional program for more liberal policies with
third-party State D if bilateralism is an option. The ability of states to
exit regional frameworks-an option at least conceptually predicated
on an open regional framework with immaterial political costs-would
likely prompt a reassessment by regional members of their internal
policies.
The point is not that bilateral cooperation is always possible or
normatively preferable from the standpoint of RIA member states.
Clearly, the CAN demonstrates that opt outs are not seamless events,
even where states adopt ostensibly "open" regional frameworks.
Moreover, even if bilateralism is available and welfare maximizing in
one iteration, it does not mean that RIA membership on the whole,
from an aggregate accounting of policies, will not produce greater
gains for members. Indeed, even in the EC, states abiding by the CAP
received generous structural adjustment funds through other
programs to help them modernize a variety of sectors, including
agriculture. 20 0 What is apparent, however, is that bilateral
cooperation-a reality predating and, in some instances, superseding
regional pacts-need not always comprise a welfare-minimizing
approach for members of some groups, or for groups beset by
coordination problems.
2. Identity Politics and Defection
Though bilateralism may at times comprise a welfaremaximizing approach for some members of RIAs, not all states are
equally positioned to take advantage of bilateral opportunities.
Ultimately, a state's choice will be informed not only by the relative
benefits of membership in a particular RIA, but also by the variety of
costs of opting out of that regime. To borrow from rational choice
theory, we can expect a state to opt out of, or "defect" from, their
regional clubs when the surplus value produced by a new relationship

200. For a description of some of the EC's structural assistance programs, see generally
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EC FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR SPECIAL SESSION II ON THE ROLE OF OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE
IN CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2000), available at

http://www.unece.org/ead/misc/ffd2000/Financial.pdf.
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is greater than the costs of defection and the surplus value produced
20 1
by an older alliance.
The precise costs of actually opting out long have been a matter
of interest among scholars of international law. Generally,
commentators have characterized costs of defections from specifically
economic commitments as either "reciprocal" or "reputational" in
nature. 20 2 Reciprocity refers to retaliation by states harmed or
"victimized" by defection. 20 3 For example, under the GATT and other
treaties that regulate the exchange of private and club goods, the
breach of a particular commitment, such as the adoption of
impermissible tariffs and subsidies, exposes the breaching country to
retaliatory action by the country against which the commitment was
not honored. Aggrieved member states may either pursue money
damages or engage in trade retaliation by suspending equivalent
"concessions or other obligations" against the scofflaw state. 20 4 Under
Article XXVIII of the GATT, modification imposes similarly robust
costs. 20 5 A state may modify or increase a tariff to which it has agreed
in a prior negotiation; however, if the modifying state does not reach
agreement with the states that would be affected by the proposed
tariff, then the affected states are permitted to withdraw substantially
20 6
equivalent concessions.
In contrast to reciprocal responses, reputational costs refer to
the negative consequences that follow when other states readjust their
estimates of the defecting state's reliability. 20 7 States make a variety
of commitments as international personalities. Some commitments are
formal, memorialized in legal instruments like treaties or memoranda
of understanding. Conversely, other obligations are coerced, at times
tacitly, as countries impose their expectations on other (usually
20 8
weaker) states. In either case, though perhaps to varying degrees,
social regularities-norms-may evolve, and countries may feel

201. See generally Gregory M. Duhl, Property and Custom: Allocating Space in Public Places,
79 TEMP. L. REV. 199, 231-36 (2006) (describing rational choice theory).
202. George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and InternationalLaw,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S98 (2002).
203. Id.
204. GATT, supra note 31, art. XIX.
205. Id. art. XXVIII.
206. Id. art. XXVIII(3)(a); Jide Nzelibe, The CredibilityImperative: The PoliticalDynamics of
Retaliation in the World Trade Organization's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 215, 221 (2005).
207. Downs & Jones, supranote 202.
208. Norms and political expectations represent weaker compliance mechanisms than law.
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obligated to follow them out of a fear of extra-legal repercussions. 20 9
When a state fails to comply with legal rules or expectations, the
affected countries will readjust their views as to the state's
attractiveness as an ally in the future: "[w]hen a member of an
organization goes back on a commitment, it compromises in some
degree its reputation as a reliable partner and jeopardizes its ability
to continue to reap organizational benefits." 210 Simply put, other
states will be less willing to enter into future agreements. 21 1 As a
result, rational governments often seek to maintain strong
reputations, even when their short-term interests may not clearly
dictate such compliance.
Between the two responses, reputational costs are the most
important factor informing compliance in regional organizations.
Sanctioning authority is rarely, if ever, granted to individual member
states. Instead, "retaliation" is facilitated through either executive
enforcement or special tribunals. In the former case, countries have
little involvement in securing another member's compliance, beyond
perhaps informing the commission of a violation of regional law;
thereafter, the commission acts as a kind of policeman, enforcing
compliance to regional laws. In the latter scenario, where tribunals
are instituted, disputes between states generally are carried out by
proxy, insofar as a person or company of one state initiates a claim
seeking compensation or injunctive relief against another regional
member state. Countries generally avoid direct confrontation with one
another to avoid eroding diplomatic relations. Moreover, like many
private parties, countries are increasingly skeptical of arbitration; not
only is the process difficult and costly, but even where countries are
involved, and a party secures a favorable judgment, enforcement of
that judgment is likely an onerous process.
As a result, reputational costs usually figure more centrally
than reciprocal responses when a country decides whether to comply
with or honor regional commitments. Having a strong reputation as a
reliable regional partner helps a country ensure cooperation from its
neighbors, a crucial strategic objective for most states. Regional
economic ties are generally more interdependent than those between
far-flung countries, heightening the need for robust collaboration in
209. See Downs & Jones, supra note 202 ("[R]eputational concerns are an important force for
compliance in connection with certain agreements.").
210. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 273 (1995).

211. See Downs & Jones, supra note 202, at S95-96 ("[A] major... reason why states keep
commitments ...

is because they fear that any evidence of unreliability will ...

to reduce their willingness to enter into future agreements.").

lead other states
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the governance of regional economies. 212 Furthermore, an economic or
social crisis in one country often has important spillovers in
neighboring countries and thus requires close regional coordination.
Having a strong reputation helps a country to foster regional solutions
for such challenges, as well as to engage problems that cannot be
solved on a local or multilateral level. On the other hand, when states
fail to live up to their commitments or institutional norms, they will
attain "bad" reputations that will inform the degree to which other
members collaborate with them to pursue common goals and agendas
in the future. Indeed, states may incur serious reputation costs that
are not so much related to noncompliance with formal commitments,
but instead flow from a perceived inability to respect regional norms
and customs and live up to policy expectations. In such circumstances,
a state's neighbors may view it not as a partner, but as an adversary.
Yet for all of the importance that reputation holds for states, it
is conceivable, and indeed likely, that defection holds differentiated
consequences for the members of an RIA. Recent international
relations theory has suggested in similar contexts that the relative
size of a state is important. 21 3 Large states, in theory, have less to fear
in defecting from small states because mid- and larger-sized countries
will discount their noncompliance. "While states have reason to revise
their estimate of a state's reputation following a defection or pattern of
defections, they have reason to do so only in connection with
agreements that they believe ... are valued the same or less by the
defecting state." 214 However, the inverse argument can be made in the
regional context on even more practical grounds. Where defections in
an RIA occur, the reputational consequences are not so much tied to
the size of the victim, but to the size of the defector and the
importance of that member to the policy goals of the RIA. Cooperation
is,in short, most valuable to those "who must coordinate with others
in order to remain relevant" in the institutions in which they
participate. 215 Under such circumstances, a track record of adhering to
institutional norms, member-state expectations, and regional laws
may enhance a smaller member's status among its peers and influence

212. At least historically, countries develop deep trade and investment ties with one
another's neighbors before venturing into far-flung destinations.
213. See Downs & Jones, supra note 202, at S104 (noting that "[t]he capacity limitations of
states to deal with agreements ... vary a great deal," which may affect the "reputational
implications" of a defection).
214. Id. at S97.
215. Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your Sign?-International Norms, Signals, and
Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 695, 700 (2006) (describing the dynamics incentivizing
regulators to cooperate and adhere to network norms).
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with the group. 216 On the other hand, when a small state fails to live
up to the expectations of large members or defects from its regional
commitments, it risks incurring sanction. Regional members might
conclude that the state is a "bad" partner and seek to revoke that
state's membership or isolate it politically.
Reputational dynamics are different when a large state defects.
Although RIA members will reevaluate their estimations of the large
country's reliability, a bad reputation nonetheless may have few real
implications or costs for the large country, because of its regional
importance. Unlike broader multilateral environments where a
variety of large, medium, and small countries interact, RIAs have a
limited number of actors; therefore, a member state has fewer options
for achieving regional goals. As a result, the participation of the large
state may be necessary in any or all of the RIA's endeavors, either due
to its (internal or external) political influence or market size. Where
smaller member states, such as Bolivia, may not have the option of
coordinating efforts around countries that do not meet their
expectations, larger states may attain a bad reputation without
incurring significant reputational costs. 21 7 In contrast, small states
may incur insignificant costs, particularly if they are members of a
small RIA with few members. Likewise, mid-sized countries (like
Venezuela) also may incur minor reputational costs, particularly in
small RIAs with similarly sized members that depend on each other
for successful action. Nevertheless, these observations do not detract
from this Section's theoretical point: the larger the state, the fewer the
practical implications of defection in an RIA.
This insight, when read in conjunction with the coordination
problems described above that beset many, if not all, RIAs, leads to a
disconcerting implication: larger states likely will not only benefit
more from regional integration than smaller states, but they also will
be best positioned to take advantage of welfare-enhancing bilateral
216. See id. at 707-08 ("[N]orms regulate behavior by taxing and subsidizing actions
associated with defection and compliance.").
217. Obviously, the relative size of a regional organization is also a crucial independent
variable informing the implications of any particular state's defection. Where RIAs have few
members, disparities between large and small states become critical, because small states will be
unable to forge coalitions to coordinate policies around larger members. However, when RIAs
consist of many members, small states may find opportunities to effectively contract around a
larger state in the formulation of policy. Furthermore, where the cooperation of all states is
necessary in order to properly effectuate a common goal, a small state's participation may
become more important, and its power enhanced. Under such circumstances, though it may
obtain a bad reputation, larger states may still engage the smaller country in a subsequent
iteration in order to effectuate group objectives. In any case, even here, the power or greatness of
a state is key: the larger the state, the more the reputational consequences will be offset by the
practicalities of its participation.
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defections. Regionalism benefits, in short, large countries on both the
front and back ends of the integration process. They are positioned to
create rules that allow them to capture more of the surplus generated
by regional cartels. At the same time, however, if they defect, they
generally do not have to worry as much as smaller countries about the
effects that their noncompliance will have for their strategic regional
goals. Though a large country may face opprobrium from smaller
states-indeed, some could withdraw altogether from the RIA-the
likelihood of such conduct is rare when there are significant
differences in the size of the countries, and the large state lies at the
center of its smaller neighbors' most valued cooperative relationships.
D. A Programfor FurtherInquiry
In identifying and examining three levels of lawmaking in both
the investment and trade sectors, this Article illustrates that the
conflicts arising between regional and multilateral commitments are
qualitatively different from those arising between regional and
bilateral agreements. In the multilateral context, regionalism has
arisen largely as an exception to the WTO's MFN rules, which
ordinarily require a member to extend the same benefits to all other
members. 2 18 And, as an exception, regionalism is still permitted, at
least theoretically, under the rules of the global trade system. In the
regional context, in contrast, RIAs and their member states may find
that bilateral agreements are incompatible with legal or political
objectives. Accordingly, the friction between bilateral and regional
systems is quite unlike that between regional and WTO
multilateralism, and it potentially has more sweeping implications. In
multilateral commitments, RIAs may establish merely a "floor" for
liberalization; whereas in the bilateral context they may act as a
''ceiling" against further liberalization efforts of member states.
The occasionally disruptive role played by RIAs in both
contexts highlights the need to explore more fully the extent to which
treaty negotiators consciously tailor RIAs to leverage power
imbalances in the group. Institutional design theory suggests that
states and other international actors design institutions purposefully
to advance their joint interests. 219 Nevertheless, as this Article
demonstrates, states are generally as much beholden to their own
interests as they are to maximizing joint welfare, if not more so.

218. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
219. Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, in THE
RATIONAL DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 21 (Koremenos et al. eds., 2004).
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Presumably, therefore, states expound on these self-interests when
crafting regional arrangements-not only in terms of members'
substantive commitments and policies, but also in negotiating sectoral
coverage (e.g. trade, investment, services, etc.), group decisonmaking
mechanisms, and membership. Indeed, the case studies demonstrate
that power configurations and self-interest inform some of the legal
frameworks undergirding RIAs. To explore more fully these dynamics
in practice, however, an empirical study is needed to address how
regional organizations develop over time and distribute economic and
political gains. An interdisciplinary account that ties evolving
strategic considerations to existing institutional and legal mechanisms
would help account for the variety of different species of regional
integration and also greatly advance prevailing theories of multi-level,
international rulemaking. It also would serve as a platform for more
precisely assessing the actual group welfare implications for regional
agreements.
The dramatic proliferation of both regional instruments and
bilateral agreements points to additional areas of investigation. As
with regionalism, the utility of bilateral instruments has been
examined almost entirely in the context of open multilateralism.
Structural inconsistency frustrates such simple dichotomies not only
by positing a multi-tiered view of international commitments, but also
by highlighting the complexity of economic integration. Indeed, some
state responses to structural inconsistency suggest that just as some
regional organizations may be more amenable to bilateral agreements,
some bilateral agreements may be more amenable to regional
organizations. For example, just five days after caving in to heavy
domestic and regional pressure militating against a U.S.-backed
BFTA, Uruguay announced plans to sign a non-binding "Trade
Investment Framework Agreement" in its place. 220 In terms of
implementation, the country's president suggested tacking traderelated measures to a recently completed BIT with the United
States-which has escaped scrutiny from Mercosur-in an attempt to
22
advance liberalization. '
The very notion of treaty substitution implies that perhaps
some bilateral agreements are more palatable than others, a point
that deserves significant theoretical analysis. Any explanation for
bilateral substitution necessarily would be sectoral in nature, as the
EC's ultimate amendments of accession candidates' BITs suggest. Yet
220. Uruguay Opts for Preferential Trade Agreement With U.S., MERCOPRESS, Sept. 28,

2006, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id article=6094.
221. Id.
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even here, in the details of sectoral scope and the evolution of bilateral
agreements, intriguing possibilities persist-including the evolution of
the global economy to encompass emerging points of contention, like
services and intellectual property, as well as potential path
dependency models highlighting the importance of pre-existing
institutional frameworks. Furthermore, evolving legal technologies
may account for sources of strategic friction, whether from the greater
commitments implied by MFN treatment as countries enter into
increasing numbers of commercial treaties or from novel innovations
such as investor-state arbitration and non-binding liberalization
instruments. Ultimately, interdisciplinary study can advance the
literature greatly by providing a more complete picture of the
potentially varying textures of bilateral cooperation and by tying the
sectoral scope and legal technologies of select bilateral instruments to
the strategic concerns of countries negotiating them (particularly GDP
or market imbalances). This kind of investigation then could lead to a
larger comparative study incorporating new insights about
regionalism gleaned from the program above.
Of course, some responses to structural inconsistency suggest
that in choosing economic alliances, states do not always act in an
economically efficient manner. Indeed, many countries adhere to
regional frameworks even where discrete bilateral initiatives or
programs might proffer greater economic gains for both individuals
and the group. Such institutional loyalty implies that other noneconomic factors inform the decisionmaking of many states. Perhaps
most obviously, domestic political concerns may sway the
decisionmaking of political elites. Where prevailing regional alliances
are popular, a political leader may be punished for defecting and
cooperating with an unpopular outsider, even if such cooperation is
efficient. Institutional scope also may account for regional
steadfastness. Increasingly, regional organizations are not only
economic institutions, but also forums of choice for addressing a
variety of common societal challenges,
including security,
immigration, and the environment. Effective responses to such
concerns are public goods and, as such, are unlikely to be provided
efficiently in the absence of an external intervention like an RIA. 222 As
a result, the implications of defection in one area, such as trade, could
extend beyond that sector to affect a country's resolution of issues or
disputes in other sectors like security or investment. The possibility of
222. See SCHIFF & WINTERS, supra note 9, at 20 ("The trade component of an RIA can
provide specie to help overcome opposition to ... policy reforms .... [I]f the reforms and [trade]
policies are desirable in their own right, combining them might be politically efficient.").
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such spillovers warrants closer analysis of RIAs-and indeed
international organizations generally-as they challenge dominant
international relations theories that minimize the reputational
consequences of defection outside of the context in which defection
occurs.
CONCLUSION

International economic law has witnessed a profusion of
regional and bilateral trade and investment treaties memorializing a
complex web of economic alliances and commitments. At its best, this
phenomenon breaks down unproductive tariff walls to improve the
welfare of participants. However, decentralized integration also poses
challenges, particularly where regional and bilateral instruments
conflict with one another. Under such circumstances, participants in
some regional organizations will be tied to political arrangements or
legal commitments that preclude other beneficial linkages. The
potential incompatibility of overlapping bilateral and regional regimes
carries substantial implications for discussions of international
economic integration and governance. Most notably, it demonstrates
that in undermining bilateral agreements, regionalism poses
challenges to global efficiency that are potentially as far reaching as
regionalism's repercussions on the WTO. It also illustrates that
because the benefits of regional integration are not always distributed
equitably, regionalism at times may comprise a sub-optimal
framework for small and strategically disadvantaged member states.
In presenting a broader picture of the kinds of inefficiencies and
fairness effects created by regional legal regimes, this Article accounts
for the externalities that regional legal regimes generate and
highlights previously unnoticed trade-offs in economic integration.

